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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Agency's Finding of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order 





) TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. 











Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Respondent 
Cheryl Rambo 
Deputy Attorney General 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Counsel for Appellant 
Kate A. Hawkins 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
1229 Main Street 
PO Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Date: 3/3/2017 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 03:09 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 3 Case: CV-2015-0001673 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
Date Code User Judge 
9/4/2015 NGOC KATHY New Case Filed-other Claims Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
PETN KATHY Petition For Judicial Review P. Gaskill DJ 
ATTR KATHY Subject: Knox, Travis David Attorney Retained Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Kate A Hawkins 
KATHY Filing: l3a - Petition for Review of Judgment of Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
IDWR, Adm in. of Water Rights Paid by: 
Hawkins, Kate A (attorney for Knox, Travis David) 
Receipt number: 0013924 Dated: 09/04/2015 
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Knox, Travis 
David (subject) 
9/17/2015 TERESA Motion to Dismiss Knox's Petition for Judicial Jay Gaskill DJ 
Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and 
Motion to Set Aside Pursuant to IRCP 84(n) and 
LC. §67-5273(2)---see order dated 12-21-15 
9/22/2015 MISC TERESA Petitioner's Objection to the Idaho Central Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Registry's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Judicial 
Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and 
Motion to Set Aside----see order dated 12-21-15 
12/18/2015 MOTN TERESA Motion to Correct Clerical Errors Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
12/21/2015 ORDR TERESA Order to Correct Clerical Errors Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
5/13/2016 NOTC TERESA Notice of Hearing Jay P. Ga ski!! DJ 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 06/21/2016 09:00 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
AM) Petition for Judicial Review 
6/21/2016 ADVS TERESA Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
06/21/2016 09:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Petition for Judicial Review 
DCHH TERESA District Court Hearing Held Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
MINE TERESA Minute Entry Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing type: Petition for Judicial Review 
Hearing date: 6/21/2016 
Time: 8:59 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 
Katherine Hawkins 
Cheryl Rambo 
6/27/2016 NOTC TERESA Notice of Filing---State Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
7/6/2016 MISC TERESA Petitioner's Response to Idaho Central Registry's Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Post-Hearing Case Notes to the Court 
7/8/2016 MISC TERESA Exhibit A & 8--inadvertently not included with Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Petitioner's Response to Idaho Central Registry's 
Post Hearing Case Notes to the Court 
7/22/2016 OPOR TERESA Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss---DENIED Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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Date: 3/3/2017 Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County User: BDAVENPORT 
Time: 03:09 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 3 Case: CV-2015-0001673 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
Date Code User Judge 
8/22/2016 NOTC TERESA Notice of Lodging of The Agency Record Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
NOTC TERESA Notice of Filing The Agency Record With the P. Gaskill DJ 
District Court 
8/25/2016 ORDR TERESA Order for Telephonic Scheduling Conference Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Conference 09/07/2016 09:15 AM) 
9/9/2016 ORDR TERESA Order Scheduling Briefs and Argument Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
DCHH TERESA Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Conference scheduled on 09/07/2016 09:15 AM: 
District Court Hearing He!d---lN CHAMBERS 
Court Reporter: NO COURT REPORTER 
PRESENT 
HRSC TERESA Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic 11/22/2016 Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
10:00 AM) Telephonic Oral Argument 
9/21/2016 STIP TERESA Stipulation to Extend Deadlines to File Briefs P. Gaskill DJ 
9/22/2016 ORDR TERESA Order to Extend Deadlines to File Briefs Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
10/3/2016 MISC TERESA Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
10/31/2016 MISC TERESA Respondent's Brief Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
11/3/2016 STIP TERESA Stipulation to Extend Deadline to file Reply Brief Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
and Continuance of Oral Argument 
11/4/2016 ORDR TERESA Order Extending Deadline to File Reply Brief and Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Hearing on Oral Argument 
CONT TERESA Continued (Telephonic 12/13/2016 11 :00 AM) Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Telephonic Oral Argument 
11/28/2016 MISC TERESA Petitioner's Reply Brief Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
12/12/2016 HRVC TERESA Hearing result for Telephonic scheduled on Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
12/13/2016 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Telephonic Oral Argument 
12/13/2016 STIP TERESA Stipulation to Vacate Oral Argument and Submit Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Case to the Court Based on Briefing 
12/14/2016 ORDR TERESA Order to Vacate Oral Argument and Submit Case Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
to Court Based on Briefing 
ADVS TERESA Case Taken Under Advisement Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
1/10/2017 OPOR TERESA Opinion & Order on Petition for Judicial Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Review--SOR's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law anf Final Order Regarding Sex Offender 
Registration 8-5-15--AFFIRMED 
CDIS TERESA Civil Disposition entered for: Knox, Travis David, Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Subject. Filing date: 1/10/2017 
STAT TERESA Case Status Changed: Closed Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
2/6/2017 NTAP BDAVENPORT Notice Of Appeal Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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Date: 3/3/2017 
Time: 03:09 PM 
Page 3 of 3 
Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2015-0001673 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
User: BDAVENPORT 









BDAVENPORT Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Supreme Court Paid by: Knox, Travis David 
(subject) Receipt number: 0001657 Dated: 
217/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Knox, 
Travis David (subject) 
BDAVENPORT Appealed To The Supreme Court Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
BDAVENPORT Bond Posted -Cash (Receipt 1659 Dated Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
2/7/2017 for 100.00) 
BDAVENPORT Condition of Bond Estimate for Clerk's Record Jay P. Gaskill DJ 





























PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
KATE A. HA WK.INS 
Idaho State Bar No. 9097 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743:.9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
SEP Y Pfi 2 yy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, ) 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding ) 
Sex Offender Registration ) 







PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW, TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, the petitioner in the above-entitled matter, by 
and through his undersigned attorney of record, and pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5270(3) 
hereby respectfully petitions this Court for judicial review of the Agency's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender-Registration entered by the Idaho 
State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, on August 5, 2015. A copy of said final Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". It is unknown to petitioner and his undersigned counsel what 
initiated the Agency's action. What procedure the Agency's action followed is also unknown. The 
petitioner is filing a motion to reconsider the State oficlaho. Bureau of Criminal Identification's, 




























decision. The agency in which judicial review is sought is the State ofldaho, Bureau of Criminal 
Identification's Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry. 
The issues on appeal include but are not limited to the following: 
1. Whether or not the Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification's Idaho 
Central Sex Offender Registry failed to hold a hearing for an equivalency determination under 
IDAPA 11.10.03.12? 
2. Whether or not the Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification's Idaho 
Central Sex Offender Registry, failed to follow due process? 
3. Whether or not the Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification's Idaho 
Central Sex Offender Registry's action and hearing was timely? 
4. Whether or not the Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification's Idaho 
Central Sex Off ender Registry's hearing officer or agency head had the proper authority to support 
its final order. 
5. Any other such issue that may be identified after the Idaho State Police, Bureau 
of Criminal Identification's Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's record has been requested and 
supplied. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2015. . 
' / I r1 [ 
PETITION FOR .WDICL\L REViE\:V 2 
CLA~T< (md #EENEff, rJ,p 
By:.....,.,._._ _____ ~-------
Katc ii\. Harwki,ns, an assoeigte of the firm. 



























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of September, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
Dawn A. Peck, CPM 
Manager/Designated Agency Head 
Idaho State Police 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
700 S. Stratford Dr. Ste 120 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile at: (208) 884. 7193 
By:_,------------
Kate A. Hawkins, an associate of the firm. 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK A ND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
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Idaho State Police 
Service Since 1939 
Colonel Ralph W, PoweD 
Director 
Bureau of Criminal Identification 
August 5, 2015 
Travis David Knox 
1136 30l11 St 
Lewiston ID 83501-3473 
RE: AGENCY'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER 
REGARDrNG SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
Dear Mr. Knox: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
C.L. "Butch" Otter 
Governor 
In Idaho, a sex offender who is convicted in another jurisdiction must register under IDAHO CODE § 18-
8304(1 ): 
[8J (b) if, "On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a 
conspiracy to commit a crime i.t1 another jurisdiction or who has a foreign conviction that is 
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section and enters this 
state to establish residence or for employment purposes or to attend, on a full-time or part-time 
basis, any public or private educational institution including any secondary school, trade or 
professional institution or institution of higher education." 
0 ( c) when he or she, "Has been convicted of any clime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy 
to commit a crime in another jurisdiction, including military courts, that is substantially 
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1) (a) of this section and was required to register 
as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established residency in Idaho." 
D ( cl) when be or she, "Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter 
prior to July l, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county jail 
fr:1cil ity or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after July l, l 993 ." 
Pursuant to IDAHO CODE § § 18-8304 and ID APA Rule 11.10.03. l 2 et seq., the Idaho Central Sex 
Offender Registry (SOR) is granted the authority to determine if the crimes you were convicted of in 
Oregon are substantially equivalent to an offense in Idaho that requires you to register. According to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, the term "substantially equivalent" does not mean that the crime you were 
AGENCY'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORHER 
REGARDING SEX OFFENDER Rl~GISTRATION 1 
700 South Stratford Suite 120 • Meridian, Idaho 83642-6251 
OPPORTTJNITY ErviPLOYER 
9
convicted of in another state must be exactly identical to a sex crime in Idaho, in order for ref:,ristration in 
Idaho to be required. 
In cases where state laws have age limitations on ceitain sexuat offenses, and the victim's age must be 
made known, the SOR may review the information, indictment or other documents from your underlying 
criminal case. Depending on the language in the statute under which you were convicied, the SOR may 
also review other portions of the documents in the underlying criminal case. These reviews arc 
commonly made to the in making the proper detc1111ination of which Idaho sex offense is 
substantially equivalent io the crime you were convicted of in Oregon. 
Pursuant to TITLE 67, CHAPTER 52, IDAHO and the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the 
Attorney Generai (ID APA 04.11. 01), Rule 720.02.c, the agency head may designate another person to 
issue a final order. ln cases involving sex offender registration matters, the agency head for the Idaho 
State Police has designated the manager of the Bureau of Criminal Jdentification as the final decision 
maker. 
It FACTUAL 
The SOR has reviewed your case and makes the follmving finding of facts: On December 17, 2002, you 
were convicted of: 
llS] OneCount 
D Two Counts 
0 Three Counts 
LJ Four Counts 
0 Five or more Counts 
Oregon Revised Statute§ 163.355, Rape in the Third Degree; 
And, 
~ OneCount 
0 Two Counts 
D TIU'ee Counts 
D Four Counts 
0 Vive or more Counts 
Oregon Revised Statute § l 63 .425, Sexual A busc in the Second Degree, 
At the time the offenses were committed the victim's age was: 15 years. 
AGENCY'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER 
REGARDING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 2 
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DL CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The SOR applies the law as follows: 
The criminal elements contained in Oregon Revised Statute § 163 J Rape in the Third are 
substantially equivalent to those found in IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with Minor Child under 
And, 
The crlminal elements in Oregon Revised Statute § 163 425, Sexual Ahusc in tbe Second 
Degree arc substantially equivalent to those found in IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with l'vlinor 
under Sixteen. 
Your convictions of Oregon Revised Statute § 163.355, Rape in the Third and Oregon Revised 
Statute § l 63 .425, Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree are both equated to an aggravated offense in the 
state of Idaho, per IDAHO CODE § 18-8303( l ). 
Under current Idaho la\V, you are required to register in the state ofidaho for iifo. 
AGENCY'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER 
REGARDING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 3 
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IV. RIGHT TO APPEAL 
According to IDAHO CODE§ 67-5246(4), this is a final order of the agency. You may file a motion for 
reconsideration of this final order within fourteen (14) days of the service date of this order. The motion 
for reconsideration should be addressed to Dawn A. Peck at the address given below. The agency will 
dispose of the petition for reconsideration within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt, or the petition will 
be considered denied by operation of law should the twenty-one (21) days pass without fu1ther action 
being taken by the agency. 
Pursuant to Sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, IDAHO CODE, any party aggrieved by this final order or orders 
previously issued in this·case may appeal this final order and all previously issued orders in this.case to 
district court by filing a petition in the district comt of the county in which: 
i. A hearing was held, 
ii. The final agency action was taken, 
iii. The party seeking review of the order resides, or operates its principal place of business in 
Idaho, or 
iv. The real property or personal prope1ty that was the subject of the agency action is located. 
Such an appeal must be filed with the District Comt within twenty-eight (28) days (a) of the service date 
of this final order, (b) of an order denying petition for reconsideration, or ( c) the failure within twenty-one 
(21) days to grant or deny a petition for reconsideration, whichever is later. See Section 67-5273, IDAHO 
CODE. 
The filing of an appeal to district court does not itself stay the effectiveness or enforcement of the order 
under appeal. See, IDAHO CODE§ 67-5274. 
DATED this 5th day of August 2015. 
DAWN A. PECK, CPM 
Manager/Designated Agency Head 
Idaho State Police 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
700 S Stratford Dr., Ste. 120 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
AGENCY'S FINDINGS FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V AND FINAL ORDER 
REGARDING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FTI\IAL 
ORDER OF THE AGENCY in the above-referenced matter by mailing the same, postage pre-
paid via first class mail and addressed to the following: 
Travis David Knox 
1136 30th St 
Lewiston ID 83501-3473 
cc: Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
Nez Perce County Sheriffs Office 
/car 
AGENCY'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER 
REGARDING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 5 
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STEPHANIE A. ALTIG 
Lead Deputy Attorney General 
CHERYL EMMONS MEADE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050 
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228 
Idaho State Bar No. 6200 
Attorney for the Idaho State Police 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
2087993070 
ISP AG OFFICE 
NPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
PAGE 02/05 
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V ·. ~ V . ~EPWTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE. OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
) tv,s-1c, 73 










MOTION TO DISMISS KNOX'S 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
TIME AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
PURSUANT TO J.~C.P.84(n) AND I.e. 
§ 67-5273(2) 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Idaho State Police~ Bureau of Criminal Identification, Idaho Sex Offender Registry 
("SOR"), by and through counsel, Cheryl Emmons Meade, Deputy Attorney General, and hereby 
MOTION TO DISMISS -- KNOX'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
TIME AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 1 
14
'
1 09/17/2015 08:40 
RECEIVED 09/17/2015 07:35 
20888472"q 
2087993070 
ISP AG OFFICE 
NPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
PAGE 03/06 
motions the Court to dismiss the Petitioner's (Knox) Motion for Enlargement of Time, Petition 
for Judicial Review and Motion to Set Aside, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(n) and IDAHO CODE§ 67-
5273(2). 
IDAHO CODE § 67-5273(2) controls the time frame by which a petition for judicial review 
must be filed by. It states in relevant part, '1A petition for judicial review of a final order ... must 
be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of the final order ... " This code 
provision, when conpled with the relevant language ofI.R.C.P. 84(n) that states ''the failure to 
physically file a petition for judicial review within the time limits prescribed by statute shall be 
jurisdictional" has a consequence. That con.sequence consists of an automatic dismissal of the 
petition fo:r judicial review upon motion of any party. 
The issue of the loss of jurisdiction has been argued many times over before Idaho's 
appellate courts. See Horne v. Idaho State University, 138 Idaho 700, 703, 69 P.3d 120, 123 
(2003) "The filing of a petition for judicial review within the time permitted by statute is 
jurisdictional;" Canyon County Bd of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC, 143 Idaho 
58, 62, 137 P.3d 445,449 (2006) "Pursuant to Rule 84(n) [of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure], the failure to timely file a petition for judicial review 'shall be jurisdiction.al and 
shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review.' '' 
In this case, the service date of the agency's final order is August 5, 2015. Twenty-eight 
days :from that date would be Wednesday, September 2, 2015. Knox missed the filing date by 
two days accorcling to the Idaho Repository web page. See attached and incorporated herein, 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, MOTION FOR ENLARGEMl:NT OF TIME 
AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 2 
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09/17/2015 08:40 
RECEIVED 09/17/2015 07:35 
208884 7'.?CJ_q 
2087993070 
ISP AG OFFICE 
~JPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
PAGE 04/05 
State's Exhibit l. See also Certificate of Service (last page) Knox's Exhibit A attached to his 
Petition for Judicial Review. 
In a case analogous to this one, the petitioner was also two days too late to file a petition 
for judicial :review_ The Idaho Supreme Court held, "Bee.a.use the petition for judicial review 
,.,,as not filed within the time provided by Idal10 Code § 67-5273(2), the district comt did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the petition for judicial review, and we do not have jurisdiction to 
review the merits of the issues raised on appeal to th.is Court. Therefore, we vacate the judgment 
of the district court and dismiss this appeal. On remand, the district court shall dismiss the 
petition for judicial review. Erickson v. Idaho Bd. of Registration of Prof Engineers and Prrl 
Land Surveyors, 203 P.3d 1251, 56 (Idaho 2009).1 
Based upou the foregoing, the SOR respectfully requests that Knox's Petition for Judicial 
Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion to Set Aside be dismissed sinc.e this court 
no longer has jurisdiction over the agency's action and the only mec.hanis1n allowed by statute to 
review an agency action is under Title 67 Chapter 52, IDAHO COPE. 
Dated this /& ~ day of September, 2015. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
Bureau of Criminal Identification 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
1 In 2010 the Idaho Legislature amended the statute by substituting "service date" for "issuance" ,1nd inserted "the 
service date of" preceding "the decision.'' 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
ANO MOTION TO SET ASIDE 3 
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RECEIVED 09/17/2015 07:35 
20sss4n~,q 
2087'393070 
ISP AG OFFICE 
HF'C: AUDITOR:::; OFFICE 
PAGE 05/f)5 
CERTIFICATli~ OF Sl'.RVICE 
I HEREBY CER Tif)' that on this _/fc-t!ray of September 20 l 5, ! oause<l to be se_1V•d a "';1" an~ 
correct c,opy of the ±oregomg MOT .ON TO DISMISS PETITION FOR JlJDICtAL RE\i IE\v, 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE to: 
Paul Thornas Clark 
Clark and Feeneyi LLP 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Levviston, ID 83501 
Dan Spickler 
Nez County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Hand Delivery 




__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
Mail. 
:£ --Facsimile Trans:tnission 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE 4 
17
'' 1'' 
"_"I :_ ---- - -----~------.---, 
RECEIVED 09/17/2015 07:35 
09/17/2015 08:40 2088847?~8 2087993070 
ISP AG OFFICE 
Idaho Repository ~ Case Num," .Result Page 
Case Number Result Page 
Nez Perce 
1 Case$ Found. 
NPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
PAGE 05/05 
J;'"l:l!,C i VA i 
~~----~-·~--~------~-----------In The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
lay P. 
se:~~~~:~;- Diatrict Filed: 09/04/2015 Subtype: ~her Judge: Gaskill Status: Pending 
DJ 




09/04/2015 New Case Filed-Other Claims 
09/04/2015 Petition For Judicial Review 
0910412015 Subject: Knox, Travis David Attorney Retained Kate 
A Hawkms . 
Filing: L3a ~ Petition for Review of Judgment of 
IOWR, Admin, of Water Rights Paid by: Hawkins, 
09/04/2015 Kate A (attorney for Knox, Travis David) Receipt 
number: 0013924 Dated: 09/04/2015 Amount: 






























PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
KATE A HAWKINS 
ldaho State Bar No. 9097 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
F acsirnile: (208) 7 46-9160 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF \!EZ PERCE 
) 







STA TE OF IDAHO, IDAHO STATE POLICE ) 






PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO 
IDAHO CENTRAL REGISTRY'S 
IV!OT!ON TO DISMISS PETITION 
FOR ,J REVIEW, 
El\LARGEIVIENT OF TIME 
AND MOTION SET ASIDE 
COMES NOW, TR.AVIS DAVID KNOX, the pe1i1ioncr in the above-entitled matter, by 
and through his undersigned attorney of record, and hereby respectfully objects to Respondent 
State ofldaho-Idaho State Police Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's Motion to Dismiss Mr. 
Knox' Petition for Judicial Review of the Agency's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Final Order Regarding Sex Offender Registration, Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion 
to Set Aside. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISMISS- 1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 




























Petitioner, Travis Knox, filed his petition for Judicial Review of the Idaho State Police 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's (hereinafter "Agency") Final Order, with respect to the 
equivalency detem1ination made by the Agency under the legislative grant of authority provided 
to it under Idaho Code 18-8340 and Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure 11.10.03.12 et seq., 
and on the basis that the Agency's final order was enacted through unlawful procedure and was 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. The procedural failure of Respondent to effect service of its 
Final Order on the proper party wholly responsible for the one-day delay in filing this Petition for 
Judicial Review. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner objects to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss Petition for Judicial Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion to Set Aside 
Agency's Final Order. 
The Idaho State Police Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's Final Was Improperly 
Served to Petitioner When Respondent Knew Petitioner Was Represented By Legal Counsel 
Resulting Final Was Based Upon Unlawful Procedure And Must Be Set Aside. 
Respondent argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a Petition for Judicial 
Review due to the argued untimely filing of the petition. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
However, Petitioner asserts facts sufficient to show that his petition was untimely due solely to the 
procedural failures of Respondents. 
The Agency's Final Order was not properly served on Petitioner's counsel and Petitioner's 
counsel could not file a response to the Agency's final order before the expiration of the motion to 
reconsider timing. On August 5,·2015, the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry issued a Final Order that 
made an equivalency determination under IDAPA 11.10.03.12. Neither Respondent, nor Respondent's 
counsel was made aware of the pending Administrative Agency action that resulted in the Final Order. 
As falling squarely within the definition of contested case codified at Idaho Code Section 67-5240, the 
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Agency's action required a hearing that, under Idaho Code Section 67-5242(a) required that Respondent 
and Respondent's counsel be notified of the time, place, and nature of the hearing, a statement of the legal 
authority under which the hearing is to be held, and a statement of the issues involved. None of these 
requirements under LC. 67-5242(a) were provided to Respondent's counsel. 
It is a fundamental concept that even in an administrative law proceeding, people have due 
process protection and an administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the 
affected party with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. 
Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005); White v. Idaho Forest 
Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977). In a situation where a final order is the 
resultant agency action, such situation is defined as a "contested case." Defined as such, contested 
cases under Idaho Code§ 67-5242 are afforded a procedural protection in assuring the adverse 
party is notified of a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; a statement of the legal 
authority under which the hearing is to be held; and a short and plain statement of the matters 
asserted or the issues involved. As such, notice is rightfully considered to be a critical aspect of 
due process to be afforded in any administrative process. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860, 865, 574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). The essentials of due process 
permit administrative regulation only by adherence to the fundamental principles of constitutional 
government. The legislature must appropriately prescribe standards of administrative action. The 
quasi-judicial action thus prescribed, must faithfully observe the 'rudiments of fair play'. A fair 
and open hearing is the absolute demand of all judicial inquiry. In the field of administrative 
regulation it is not only vital to the validity of the regulation imposed; it is vital 'to the 
maintenance of public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental 
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process'. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. 773,775, 82 L.Ed. 1129; Ohio Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 304, 305, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 
1093; Sabre v. Rutland Railroad Co., 86 Vt. 347,355,369, 85 A. 693." Petition of New England 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 136 A.2d 357,362 (Vt.1957). Appurtenant to the right to notice is 
the right to be fairly notified as to the issues to be considered. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860, 865, 574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). Lastly, under Idaho Code§ 
67-5242 (3)(b), at the hearing, the presiding officer shall afford all parties the opportunity to 
respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved, except as restricted by a limited 
grant of intervention or by a prehearing order. 
In the case at bar, the first notification of any action to be undertaken by the Respondent, 
let alone a completed action, was when Petitioner received a copy of the Agency's Final Order in 
the mail. That is to say, neither Petitioner nor is attorney of record was ever notified of pending 
Agency action prior to the issuance of a final order. Petitioner was precluded from presenting 
argument and evidence in response to the Agency's action. Therefore, the Agency's Final Order 
was based upon unlawful procedure. Because the claims asserted by Petitioner are sufficient to 
grant the relief requested, dismissal would be improper in this case. 
Upon the issuance of its Final Order, the Agency was required to serve the Final Order to 
Petitioner's attorney ofrecord. The Agency had notification of Respondent's representation on 
June 23, 2015 when the Agency was served with Petitioner's Petition in CV 2015-1010 for Release 
of Registration Requirement that was filed on June 2, 2015 in the District Court located in Nez 
Perce County. At some juncture, the Agency determined that a Final Order was needed and 
attempted to effectuate that result albeit through faulty procedure. Notwithstanding the faulty 
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procedure of the Agency's action, it is the Agency's procedural failure in service of the Final Order 
that directly affects Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review. 
Under the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General Rule 055-04 
the officer designated by the agency to serve documents in a proceeding must serve all orders and 
notices in a proceeding on the representatives of each party designated pursuant to these rules for 
that proceeding and upon other persons designated by these rules or by the agency. IDAP A 
04.J1.01.055.04. Under Rule 055-03, service is complete only when a copy, properly addressed 
and stamped, is deposited the United States mail or the Statehouse mail, if the party is a State 
employee or State agency, or when there is an electronic verification that a facsimile transmission 
or an e-mail has been sent. IDAPA 04.11.01.055.03. Under the facts of this case, because 
Respondent Agency did not serve Petitioner's legal representative as required under Rule 055-04, 
the Agency cannot be found to have effectuated service insomuch that the proverbial "clock" 
begins to run on the time to file a petition for judicial review. Therefore, Mr. Knox' Petition for 
J udiciai Review is not untimely because under the facts of the case, the Agency has not yet served 
its Final Order to Mr. Knox' legal representative. 
In light of the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court deny Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Judicial Review. This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss with regard to Petitioner's Motion for Enlargement of Time and 
Motion to Set Aside Final Order insomuch that said Motions were filed in the administrative action 
that resulted in the Final Order and were not filed in this Court. As such, these motions are not 
before the court and the court cannot therefore make a ruling. 
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DATED this __ ... day of September, 2015. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
By: __ ~---------
Paul Thomas Clark, a member of the finn. 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of September, 2014, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
CHERYL EMMONS MEAD 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Dr. Ste 120 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
DAWN PECK 
Manager/Designated Agency Head 
Idaho State Police 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
700 S. Stratford Dr. Ste 120 




U.S. MaiL postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile at: (208) 884.7228 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile at: (208) 884. 7193 
By: ----t--'l~-----------
Paul Tho 
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s Clark, a member of the firm. 
or Petitioner. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
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Lead Deputy Attorney General 
CHERYL RAMBO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 884-7050 
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228 
Idaho State Bar No. 6200 
Attorney for the Idaho State Police 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
) 
) Case No. CV-2015-1673 
) 
) ORDER TO CORRECT 







This Court having reviewed I.R.C.P. 60(a) and the Idaho Sex Offender Registry's Motion 
to Correct Clerical Errors and finding good cause thereof, hereby ORDERS: 
The pleading filed in Nez Perce County, Civil Case Nmnber CV-2015-1010, on 09/17/15, 
by the Idaho Sex Offender Registry and entitled; Motion to Dismiss Knox's Petition for Judicial 
Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion to Set Aside Pursuant to IRCP 84(n) and 
ORDER TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS 1 
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LC. § 67-5273(2) is hereby corrected to be enumerated under Nez Perce County, Civil Case 
Number CV-2015-1673. 
The pleading filed in Nez Perce County, Civil Case Number CV-2015-1010, on 09/22/15, 
by the Petitioner, Travis Knox and entitled; Petitioner's Objection to the Idaho Central Registry's 
Motion to Dismiss Petition fol' Judicial Review, Motion for Enlargement of Time and Motion to 
Set Aside, is hereby corrected to be enumerated under Nez Perce County, Civil Case Number 
ORDER TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS 2 
26
RECEIVED 12/18/2015 14:13 2087993070 NPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
1'.'/18/2015 16: 19 20888472?-A-" ISP AG OFFICE PAGE 07/07 
CERTIFICATE OF SER 
I HEREBY CEllTlFY that on this ~ay of\~~~- 015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO CORRECT CLERlCAL ERRORS to: 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
Attomey for Petitioner 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Dan Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Cheryl Rambo 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
Idaho Sex Offender Registry 
700 S. Stratford Dr. 
Meridian, ID 83642 
ORDER TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
U.S. Mail 
1..._ Facsimile Ttausmission 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
_ U-8.Mail 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
U.S. Mail 











ln The Matter Of Travis David Knox 
Hearing type: "Petition for Judicial Review 
Hearing date: 6/21/2016 
Time: 8:59 am 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Courtroom: 3 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTR111 3 
Katherine Havvkins 
Cheryl Rambo 
Ms. Hawkins and Ms. Rambo present. 
Ms. Hawkins presents argument 
Ms. Rambo presents argument. 
Court addresses Ms. Rambo. Ms. Rambo responds. 
Ms. Hawkins: presents rebuttal argument. 
Ms. Rambo presents rebuttal argument. 
919SO Court gives Ms. Rambo an additional v.ieek to provide t~e Court with the 
cases she referred to today then Ms. Hawkins will have an additional week to responds and 
then the Court will consider the matter submitted and will take under advisement and 
issue a vvritten decision. 
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Meridian, Idaho 83642 
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Attorney for the Respondent 
Idaho State Police 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX 
Petitioner. 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, Idaho Central Sex 
Offender Registry 
) 
) Case No. CV-15-1673 
) 









~-----Re_s_._po_:a._d_en_t_. _____ ) 
The Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, Idaho Sex Offender Registry 
("SOR"), by and through counsel, Cheryl Rambo, Deputy Attorney General, and offers tbe 
following case law summaries and citations as requested by the Court during the June 21, 2016 
NOTICE OF FILING I 
29
RECEIVED 05/24/2015 13: 21 2@87993070 HPC AUDITORS OFFICE 
Jun.24.2016 2:22PM No. 0919 P. 3 
oral argument. See attached and incorporated herein by reference, SOR' S CASE LAW 
SUMMARIES. 
DATED This Laay of June, 2016. 
OFFICE OF TI-lE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHERYL 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
CERTIFICATE OF Sl1RVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ;?.4 day of June 2016, I caused to be served, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING in the above-referenced matter on the 
following individuals by the method indicated below: 
Kate Hawkins 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lev,':iston, ID 83501 
Fax: (208) 746-9160 
NOTICE OF FILING 
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SOR'S CASE LAW SUMMARIES: 
Amendment to I.C. § 18-8303(1) -- Aggravated Offense - No Ex Post Facto 
Violation 
Groves v, Sfate 
Court of Appeals ofldaho. I April 21, 2014 J 156 Idaho 5521328 P.3d 532. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals. Walters, J., held that: 
Ill retroactive application of amendments to SORA did not constitu~ ex post facto violation, and 
[l] sex offender was not entitled to additional due process to determine whether his offense was 
aggravated offense. 
Bottnm -v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification Cent. Se:i: Offeildtl' Registry 
Supreme Court ofidaho, Boise, January 2013 Term. I February 25, 2013 I 154 Idaho 182 I 296 
P.3d388. 
Bolding: The Supreme Court, Eismann, J ., held that offender was disqualified from seeking to be 
exempted from duty to register as sex offender. 
State v. Fo:rbes 
Supreme Court ofldaho, Boise, December 2011 Term, I April 11, 20121152 Idaho 849 j 275 P.3d 
864. Substitute Opinion. 
Holdings; The Suptetne Court, W. Jones, J., held that: 
{lJ amendment that precluded dismissal of offenses requiring sex offender registration applied 
retroactively, and 
121 retroactive application of amendment did not violate ex post facto clauses. 
State v. Yeoman 
Supreme Court ofldaho, Boise, June 2010 Term. I July 26, 2010 j 149 Idaho 5051236 P.3d 1265. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Eismann, CJ., held that: 
SOR'S CASE LAW SUMMARIES 1 
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[i) statute, which imposed sex offender registration requirements upon an individual who had been 
convicted of a crime that was substantially similar t.o the crimes requiring registration in state and 
who had been required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction when the individual 
established residence in state, applied to persons whose co»victions for sex crimes occurred before 
July 1, 1993, a»d £21 statute did not violate defendant's constitutional right to travel. 
Smith "· State 
Supreme Court ofldaho, Boise, June 2008 Term. I February 10, 2009 1146 Idaho 822 [ 203 
' . P. 3d 1221. I ' KeyCile Yellow Flag • NegatiVe Treaimen\ olstinguished by Morgan v. SeXt•al Offender Clas.slflcallon ed., 
Idaho, October 26, 2009 
Discussing procedural due process in the contexts of classification as a violent sexual 
predator as opposed to a sex offender who must register by the mere fact of a conviction of a 
sex offense. 
While the duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by reason of conviction for a 
specified critlle, classification as a VSP is based upon a factual determination of probable 
foture conduct, i,e,, that the offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or engaging 
in predatory se:mal conduct. LC.§ 18-8314. This distinguishes Idaho's VSP system from a 
sex offender registry based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense. As to the 
latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex offender registration laws do 
not violate the offender's procedural due process rights, noting the offender "has already had 
a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest" the charge. Conn, Dep 't of Pub. Safety v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct.1160,1164~ 155 L.Ed.2d 98. 105 (2003); see also Doe 11• 
Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2004). In reaching this conclusion, the Supteme Couit 
emphasized that Connecticut's registry requirement is "based on the fact of previous 
conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness ... [i]ndeed, the public registry explicitly 
states that officials have not detennined that any registrant is currently dangerous.a 538 U.S. 
at41 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98, 103. 
State v. Gragg 
Court of Appeals ofldaho. j November 9, 2005 I 143 Idaho 741137 P.3d 461 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Gutierrez, J., held that Act did not violate ex post facto law. 
Sep,arate civil actions and primary orb!inal jurisdiction 
Pounds v. Denison 
Court of Appeals ofldaho, I December 23, 19881115 Idaho 3811766 P,2d 
\ •.1 1262. f ' KeyClte Yellow Flag - Negativa Treatment Distinguished by Stacey v. Department or Labor, (daho, August 28. 
2000 
Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the 
administrative body and this remedy e);dlaustod before the courts will act. Absent a statutory 
SOR'S CASE LAW SUMMARIES 2 
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exception, the exhaustion of an administrative remedy is a prerequisite for resort to the comts. 
A:?, a corollary to the exhaustion doctrine, the primary jurisdiction doctrine provides that if the 
claim or cause of action is within the special jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, courts 
may act only to review the final administrative determination. Fischer v. Seats, Roebuck and 
Co., 107 Idaho 197,687 P.2d 587 (Ct.App.1984). Ifa court allows a suit to beru.aintained prior 
to such final determination, it interferes with the subject matter jurisdiction of another tribunal. 
County of Contra Costa v. State o/California, 177 Cal.App.3d 62,222 Cal.Rptr. 750 (1986). 
Euclid Ave, Trnstv, City of Boise 
Supreme Court ofldaho,, Boise, June 2008 Term. [ September 23, 2008 I 146 
Idaho 3061193 P.3d 853. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, J. Jones) J., held that: 
(I) Supreme Court would cpnsider action as an appeal of a civil action rather than as an 
administrative appeal; 
£21 actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief may not be combined wit11 petitions for 
judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act; ... 
Premature Petition for Judicial Review 
In re Johnson 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. I May 31, 2012 ] I 53 Idaho 246 I 280 P .3d 7 49. 
Ho)dings: The Court of Appeals, Perry, Judge Pro Tern, held that: 
[lJ petition for judicial review filed prior to hearing officer's ru1ing was premature; ... 
(when petition for judicial review filed ptior to hearing officer's ruling sustaining 
administrative license suspension following motorist's ai.1·est for driving under influence was 
premature, and thus, trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear petition, where hearing officer did 
not make oral ruling at hearing or otherwise indicate ruling prior to issuance of vm.tten order. 
Appellate Rule 17( e )(2); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 84(b )(1 ); West's LC.A. § § 18-8002A(8), 67~ 
5270, 67-5273(2).) HN 8. 




























PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
KA TE A. HA WKJNS 
.. , 
Idaho State Bar No. 9097 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND illDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO STATE POLICE 
IDAHO CENTRAL REGISTRY 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV 2015-001673 
) 
) PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
) IDAHO CENTRAL REGISTRY'S 
) POST-HEARING CASE NOTES 









COMES NOW, TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, the petitioner in the above-entitled matter, by 
and through his undersigned attorneys of record, here by respectfully submits the following written 
response to the case law notes submitted to this Court by the Idaho Central Registry following 
the hearing on the Petition for Judicial Review of the agency's fmal order. 
PETITIONER'S WRITTEN RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S POST-HEARING 
CASE LAW NOTES - 1 
LAW OFFICES OF' 
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Petitioner, Travis Knox, filed his petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-5270(3), of the Idaho State Police Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's (hereinafter 
"Agency'') Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender 
Registration entered by the Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, on August 5, 
2015. Petitioner also filed a motion to reconsider the State of Idaho, Bureau of Criminal 
Identification's decision with the agency itself, with no response. A hearing on the Petitioner's 
Petition for Judicial Review was held on June 21, 2016. Based upon the argument of the SOR at 
the June 21, 2016 hearing on the Petition for Judicial Review, it is now known that Petitioner's 
original Petition for Relief from the registration requirement filed in Nez Perce County Case 
Number CVlS-0001010, was the catalyst that initiated the Agency's action as accomplished 
through the hearing conducted by the Agency's Equivalency Board (hereinafter "Equivalency 
Board"). The administrative procedure the Equivalency Board followed remains unknown. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, this Court directed the SOR to provide a list of case law summaries of 
the various cases cited to during argument and further provided that petitioner would have the 
opportunity to response. 
ARGUMENT 
With respect to the equivalency determination made by the Agency under the legislative 
grant of authority provided to it under Idaho Code §18-8304(l)(b) and Idaho Rule of 
Administrative Procedure 11.10.03.12 et seq., it is Petitioner's primary argument that the 
Agency's final order was enacted through unlawful procedure and was unreasonable, arbitrary or 
PETITIONER'S WRITTEN RESPONSE 
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capricious. Specifically, that an equivalency determination was made with respect to the 
petitioner's Oregon offenses immediately upon the notification of petitioner's relocation to Nez 
Perce County, State of Idaho, in 2003, and that the SOR cannot now come back with a 
redetermination following notification of an offender's petition for relief of the registration 
requirement. 
At issue here is simply whether or not the SOR can make a redetermination of equivalency 
using the most current statutory language following the 2012 creation of the equivalency board to 
an off ender who had out of state offenses duly equivalated to Idaho offenses 1mder the statutory 
language at the time of relocation within the jurisdiction where the original equivalency was made 
prior to the creation of the Equivalency Board 
On December 17,- 2002, in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of 
Multnomah, under Case No. 02-05-33157, Petitioner was convicted of two offenses that required 
his participation in the offender registry program in the State of Oregon. Upon his relocation to 
Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, in 2003, the petitioner did dutifully register with the State of 
Idaho Central Registry as required under Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(b), which states: 
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a 
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another jurisdiction or who 
has a foreign conviction that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed 
in paragraph (a) of this subsection and enters this state to establish residence 
or for employment purposes or to attend, on a full-time or part-time basis, 
any public or private educational institution including any secondary school, 
trade or professional institution or institution of higher education. 
Idaho Code 18-8304(l)(b). 
At that time, in 2003, and in conjunction with Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(a), the State of Idaho 
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determined that the first of petitioner's two convictions in the State of Oregon was equivalent to 
a conviction under Idaho Code § 18-1508. The evidence of the equivalency determination for this 
first conviction is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
With regard to petitioner's second of two convictions in the State of Oregon, in 2003 the 
State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(b) and in conjunction with Idaho Code 18-
8304(1 )(a), determined that the petitioner's second conviction in the State of Oregon was 
equivalent to a conviction under Idaho Code § 18-6101. The evidence of the equivalency 
determination for this second conviction is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
It is especially important to note that neither of the two convictions that required 
petitioner's participation with the offender registry were deemed an 'aggravated offense" as it was 
defined by Idaho Code 18-8303 in 2003 when the above referenced equivalency determinations 
were made. Specifically, the Oregon conviction that was determined to be equivalent to a 
conviction under Idaho Code 18-1508 is not an included offense under the controlling definition 
under Idaho Code 18-8303(1), where under the statutory language in 2003 was, as follows: 
(1) "Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in 
section· 18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is 
less than twelve (12) years of age); 18--4003(d) (murder committed in the 
perpetrationofrape); 18-6101 (rape, butexcludingsection 18-6101(l)where 
the victim is at least twelve ( 12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen ( 18) 
years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual 
penetration by use of a foreign object). 
Idaho Code 18-8303(1) as of Ch. 194, § 3, 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws 659,661. 
Also, at the time the 2003 equivalency determination and and under the facts of 
petitioner's Oregon conviction, the equivalency lent itself to the application of the express 
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exclusion as an aggravated offense because under subsection §18-8303(1) excluded from the 
definition of aggravated offense those convictions under LC. § 18-6101 (1) where the victim was 
over 12 years of age. Because the victim in petitioner's Oregon convictions was 15 years old, it 
clearly mets the "at least 12 years of age" limitation and therefore fell squarely within this 
exception to the aggravated offense definition. 
Upon review of the Idaho case law, and specifically those cases cited to by the SOR during 
oral argument at through its post-hearing filing, it appears this matter is one of first impression to 
an Idaho court. However, it remains petitioners position that making a secondary equivalency 
determination was an improper agency action where there has been no explanation as to why the 
2003 equivalency determinations are not controlling. 
RESPONSE TO CITED CASE LAW 
In response to the case law cited by the SOR, petitioner would simply point out that in each 
instance, the cases involve registrants whose offenses and convictions within the State of Idaho 
where Idaho had, and at all times retained jurisdiction. Here, this is a matter of an equivalency 
determination being made by the State of Idaho with regard to a conviction in a different 
jurisdiction, yet upon relocation to the State ofldaho, triggered notification and registration under 
Idaho Code 18-8304(l)(b). 
The relocation case cited by the SOR is State v. Yeoman is factually and procedurally 
distinguishable from this case. First, the defendant in Yeoman was convicted of a sexual offense 
outside ofldaho in 1984 and moved to Idaho in 2007. However, upon his move to Idaho in 2007, 
he failed to register as a sex offender under Idaho Code 18-8304(l)(b), and was charged with a 
PETITIONER'S WRITI'EN RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S POST-HEARING 
CASE LAW NOTES-5 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 




























crime for this failure. Mr. Yeoman's argument is not that the equivalency determination should 
have been made using the 2007, or 1984 defmitions of aggravated offense, as is petitioner's 
argument here, but rather Mr. Yeoman argues that he shouldn't have to register under Idaho Code 
18-8304(1)(b) at all because his crime occurred prior to JW1e 1, 1993. This is not petitioner's 
argument, and under petitioner's argument, Mr. Yeoman's equivalency determination would have 
been made using the 2007 definitions because that was controlling at the time he moved and 
availed himself to the jurisdiction ofidaho. Like here, where the 2003 equiv al ency determination 
was made using the laws applicable and controlling at the time petitioner moved to Nez Perce 
County and availed himself to the laws of the State of Idaho. 
SOR's cited case law also fails to address the procedural failures of the Equivalency Board 
with regard to the petitioner's due process rights in an administrative action where the petitioner 
was not afforded an opportunity to plead his case under the laws of the State ofidaho, like those 
of the Plaintiff in Groves v. State, cited by the SOR as authority with regard to due process rights. 
In Groves, the petitioner was adjudicated and convicted Wlder the laws of the State ofidaho, and 
under the due process of his trial, he was afforded the opportunity to make arguments against the 
aggravated offense determination. In this case, as petitioner was adjudicated outside the 
jurisdiction of Idaho, and he should be afforded the due process protections of an agency action 
under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. 
It is a fundamental concept that even in an administrative law proceeding, people have due 
process protection and an administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the 
affected party with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. 
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Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005); White v. Idaho Forest 
Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977). In a situation where a final order is the 
resultant agency action, such situation is defined as a "contested case." Defined as such, contested 
cases under Idaho Code § 67-5242 are afforded a procedural protection in assuring the adverse 
party is notified of a statement of the time, place, and nature of the heruing; a statement of the legal 
authority under which the hearing is to be held; and a short and plain statement of the matters 
asserted or the issues involved. As such, notice is rightfully considered to be a critical aspect of 
due process to be afforded in any administrative process. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860, 865, 574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). The essentials of due process 
permit administrative regulation only by adherence to the fundamental principles of constitutional 
government. The legislature must appropriately prescribe standards of administrative action. The 
quasi-judicial action thus prescribed, must faithfully observe the 'rudiments of fair play'. A fair 
and open hearing is the absolute demand of all judicial inquiry. In the field of administrative 
regulation it is not only vital to the validity of the regulation imposed; it is vital 'to the 
maintenance of public confidence in the value _and soundness of this important governmental 
process'. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. 773, 775, 82 L.Ed. 1129; Ohio Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 304, 305, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 
1093; Sabre v. Rutland Railroad Co., 86 Vt. 347,355,369, 85 A. 693." Petition ofNew England 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 136 A.2d 357,362 (Vt.1957). Appurtenant to the right to notice is 
the right to be fairly notified as to the issues to be considered. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860,865,574 P.2d 902,907 (1978). Lastly, under Idaho Code§ 
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67-5242 (3)(b), at the hearing, the presiding officer shall afford all parties the opportunity to 
respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved, except as restricted by a limited 
grant of intervention or by a prehearing order. 
In the case at bar, the first notification of any action to be undertaken by the Respondent, 
let alone a completed action, was when Petitioner received a copy of the Agency's Final Order in 
the mail. That is to say, neither Petitioner nor is attorney of record was ever notified of pending 
Agency action prior to the issuance of a final order. Petitioner was precluded from presenting 
argument and evidence in response to the Agency's action. Therefore, the Agency's Final Order 
was based upon unlawful procedure. Because the claims asserted by Petitioner are sufficient to 
grant the relief requested, dismissal would be improper in this case. 
Upon the issuance of its Final Order, the Agency was required to serve the Final Order to 
Petitioner's attorney of record. The Agency had notification of Respondent's representation on 
June 23, 2015 when the Agency was served withPetitioner'sPetitionin CV 2015-1010 for Release 
of Registration Requirement that was filed on June 2, 2015 in the District Court located in Nez 
Perce County. At some juncture, the Agency determined that a Final Order was needed and 
attempted to effectuate that result albeit through faulty procedure. Notwithstanding the faulty 
procedure of the Agency's action, it is the Agency's procedural failure in service of the Final Order 
that directly affects Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review. 
Under the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General Rule 055-04 
the officer designated by the agency to serve documents in a proceeding must serve all orders and 
notices in a proceeding on the representatives of each party designated pursuant to these rules for 
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that proceeding and upon other persons designated by these rules or by the agency. IDAPA 
04.11.01.055. 04. Under Rule 055-03, service is complete only when a copy, properly addressed 
and stamped, is deposited in the United States mail or the Statehouse mail, if the party is a State 
employee or State agency, or when there is an electronic verification that a facsimile transmission 
or an e-mail has been sent. IDAPA 04.11.01.055.03. Under the facts of this case, because 
Respondent Agency did not serve Petitioner's legal representative as required under Rule 05 5-04, 
the Agency cannot be found to have effectuated service insomuch that the proverbial "clock" 
begins to run on the time to file a petition for judicial review. Therefore, Mr. Knox' Petition for 
Judicial Review is not untimely because under the facts of the case, the Agency has not yet served 
its Final Order to Mr. Knox' legal representative. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court grant petitioner's 
Petition for Judicial Review and invalidate the secondary equivalency determinations that were 
made on August 5, 2015. 
DATED this Lt_ day of July, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jl_ day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
CHERYL RAMBO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Dr. Ste 120 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile at: (208) 884. 7228 
LAW OFFICES OF 
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WILLIAM JEREMY CARR 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
RUBE G. JUNES• 
KATE A. HAWKINS •• 
CHARLES M. STR_OSCHEIN •• 
THOMAS W. FE:ENEY (19ZZ-Z007) 
' LICENS!':D IN WASHINGTON & OREGON ONLY 
., LICENS!':D IN IPAHO & WASHINGTON 
Clerk of The District CoU1t 
Attn Civil Department 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
Lewiston ID 83501 
_ LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK A ND FEENEY, LLP 
THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 106 
1229 MAIN STREET 
P.O. DRAWER 285 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
July 7, 2016 
TELEPHONE: ( 208) 7 4.3-95 16 
TOLL FREE· (BOO) 865-95 16 
MAIN FAX: {208) 746-9160 
ALTERNATE FAX, (208) 798-5399 
EMAIL: cflaw@lewiston.com 
WEBSITE: www.clarkandfeeney.com 
Re: Travis David Knox v. State ofldaho, Idaho State Police Idaho Central Registry 
Case No. CV 15-001673 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed you will find as a supplemental filing to the Petitioner's Response to Idaho Central 
Registry's Post-Hearing Case Notes to the Comt, Exhibits A and B which were inadvertently not 
included with the Response filed yesterday. I apologize for any inconvenience. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of ) 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order ) 
Regarding Sex Offender Registration ) 
) 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, ) 
) 
Petitioner. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2015-1673 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter came on before the Court on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry 
(SOR)'s Motion to Dismiss Knox's Petition for Judicial Review. The Petitioner was 
represented by Kate Hawkins, of the firm Clark and Feeney. The SOR was represented 
by Cheryl Rambo, Deputy Attorney General. Argument was presented to the Court on 
June 21, 2016. The parties were given time to present additional case law after the 
hearing, and having done so, the Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders 
its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
LC. §18-8304 requires a person who is convicted in another jurisdiction to 
register as a sex offender in Idaho if the conviction is for a crime that is substantially 
equivalent to offenses set forth in the statute and if the person enters this state to establish 
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residence. On December 17, 2002, the Petitioner was convicted in Oregon of one count 
of Rape in the Third Degree, ORS§ 163.355 and one count of Sexual Abuse in the 
Second Degree, ORS § 163.425. The Petitioner has been fulfilling the requirement to 
register as a sex offender in the State ofldaho. On June 2, 2015, the Petitioner filed a 
Petition for Release from Registration Requirements and Expungement of Record. The 
Petitioner was represented by counsel in this matter. 
Two months later, on August 5, 2015, the Idaho State Police Bureau of Criminal 
Identification issued an Agency's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order 
Regarding Sex Offender Registration. The Agency concluded that the crimes committed 
by the Petitioner in Oregon were substantially equivalent to those found in LC. § 18-
1508, Lewd a Minor Child under Therefore, according to the 
Agency, under current Idaho law the Petitioner is required to register as a sex offender in 
the State ofldaho for life. 
The final section of the Agency determination explained the right to appeal the 
final order of the agency. This section explained that any party aggrieved by the final 
order must file an appeal within twenty-eight days of the service date of the final order. 
The Certificate of Service indicates the Agency's decision was mailed to the Petitioner's 
home on August 5, 2015. A Petition for Judicial Review was filed with this Court on 
September 4, 2015, two days after the twenty-eight day deadline from the date of mailing 
had passed. Shortly thereafter, the Agency filed the pending motion to dismiss the 
petition. 
OPINION AND ORDER 




The Agency filed the motion to dismiss because the Petition for Judicial Review 
was filed two days after the twenty-eight day deadline had passed. As stated above, the 
Agency sent the final order to the Petitioner's home address on August 5, 2015. The 
Petitioner asserts that the Agency was required to send the final order not to the Petitioner 
directly, but to the Petitioner's representative. The Petitioner asserts the Agency had 
notice the Petitioner was represented by counsel because approximately two months prior 
to the Final Order issuing, the Agency had received a Petition for Release 
Registration Requirements Expungement of Record in Nez Perce County case CV15-
01010. 
The Agency contends Court does not have jurisdiction to hear case 
because the Petition was filed untimely. The Petitioner relies on Horne v. Idaho State 
University in support of this argument. 
The filing of a petition for judicial review within the time permitted by 
statute is jurisdictional. Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm'n, 121 Idaho 515,826 P.2d 476 (1992). Idaho Code§ 67-5317(3) 
provides that a petition for judicial review of the decision of the Personnel 
Commission must be filed "within forty-two ( 42) days of the filing of such 
decision." In this case, the Commission issued its decision on September 
10, 2001, and mailed it to the parties on September 17, 2001. Ms. Home 
filed her petition for judicial review on October 29, 2001, forty-nine days 
after the Commission's decision was issued and forty-two days after it was 
mailed. There is nothing in the record indicating when the Commission's 
decision was filed-when it was placed in the official custody of the 
appropriate Commission personnel for preservation as a public record. 
There is no filing stamp on the document. Absent any showing that Ms. 
Home's petition for judicial review was not filed timely, this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
Horne v. Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 703-04, 69 P.3d 120, 123-24 (2003). 
In the case at hand, there is nothing in the record which indicates the Final Order 
was served on the Petitioner's counsel. It is clear it was only mailed directly to the 
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Petitioner's home address. IDAP A 04.11.01 .055 sets for the rules the agency must 
follow for service. The rule allows the agency to serve documents by regular mail to the 
party's last known mailing address. However, the rule also requires service must be 
made on the representatives of each party. 
The officer designated by the agency to serve documents in a proceeding 
must serve all orders and notices in a proceeding on the representatives of 
each party designated pursuant to these rules for that proceeding and upon 
other persons designated by these rules or by the agency. 
IDAP A 04.11.01.055.04. 
In this case, where service was not made on the Petitioner's representative, the 
Court finds that the twenty-eight day time period did not run, and thus, the Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
ORDER 
The Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
TO DI~MISS was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 
· < t\'~·day of July, 2016, on: 
Kate A. Hawkins 




700 S. Stratford 




OPINION AND ORDER 




? l (._ ____ ':__ -. ; _! 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
ZD16 AUG 22 A 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERC 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, IDAHO 
CENTRAL SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY 
Respondent. 
) 











) ________________ ) 
The Agency Record was lodged in this matter on August 4, 2016 before the Bureau of 
Criminal Identification, Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry. 
The pruiies were notified they had fourteen (I 4) days from the date of the service of said 
notice in which to file with the Agency, any objections to the record pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84G). 
To date, no objection to the Agency Record has been filed with the Agency pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 84(i). 
Therefore the Agency Record is deemed settled. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k) the Agency Record is now being filed with the district court. 
DATED this 18th day of August 2016. 
Carol A. Redding 
Criminal Records Supervisor and A ency Clerk 
Idaho State Police 
Bureau of Criminal Identification 
Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I 8th day of August 2016, I caused to be served, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING THE AGENCY RECORD WITH THE DISTRICT 
COURT in the above-referenced matter on the following individuals by the method indicated 
below: 
Cheryl E. Rambo 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian ID 83642 
Kate A. Hawkins 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
PO Drawer 285 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Interoffice Mail 
First Class Mail, postage prepaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
TRA VID DAVID KNOX, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CVlS-01673 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET AL., ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Wednesday, the 7th day of September, 2016, at the 
hour of 9: 15 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Scheduling Conference in the above-
entitled matter with THE COURT initiating the call. 
DATED this z~day of August, 2016. 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 1 
istrict Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE was: 
hand delivered via court basket, or 
---
,, 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this·-_> __ 
to: 
Kate A. Hawkins 
P O Drawer 285 
Lewiston 83501 
Cheryl Rambo 
700 S Stratford Dr 
ID 83642 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
Deputy 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
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of August, 2016, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 













CASE NO. CVlS-01673 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant, 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Petitioner's brief shall be filed by September 26, 2016; 
2) State's response brief shall be filed by October 24, 2016; 
3) Petitioner's reply shall be filed by November 7, 2016; 
4) Telephonic Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court on 
November 22, 2016, commencing at 10:00 a.m. Pacific Time. The Court will initiate 
the call. 
DATED this~ day of September, 2016. 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENT was FAXED, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, thisi'..fday of September, 2016, 
on: 
Kate Hawkins 
Fax: (208) 746-9160 
Cheryl Rambo 
Fax: (208) 884-7228 
PATTY 0. \VEEKS, CLERK 
Deputy 
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IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD!i~w .....___ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, ) Case No. CV-2015-0001673 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding ) 
Sex Offender Registration ) 
) 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, ) ORDER TO EXTEND DEADLINES TO 




BASED UPON the Stipulation to Extend Deadlines to File Briefs filed concurrently 
herewith, and good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows: 
The deadline for filing of briefs in this matter shall be extended as follows: 
October 3; 2016 Petitioner's Brief Due 
October 31, 2016 Respondent's Brief Due 
November 14, 2016 Petitioner's Reply Due 
DATED THIS 2-t rt;o[ S1:ptember, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 Z ~y of September, 2016, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
KATE A. HAWKINS 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
P O DRAWER 285 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
CHERYL R:A:MBO 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
















































PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
KATE A. HA WK.INS 
Idaho State Bar No. 9097 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding 
Sex Offender Registration 
TRAVIS DA VTD KNOX, 
Petitioner. 




) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 




COMES NOW, TRAVIS KNOX, the petitioner in above-entitled matter, by and 
through his undersigned attorneys of record, hereby respectfully submits the following Memorandum 
in Support of his petition for Judicial Review of the Final Order issued by the Idaho Central Registry 
on August 5, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Idaho Code Section 18-8304 requires a person who is convicted in anotherjurisdiction to register 
as a sex offender in Idaho if the conviction is for a crime that is substantially equivalent to offenses set 
forth in the statute and if the person enters this state to establish residency. On December 17, 2002, Mr. 
Knox was convicted in Oregon of one count of Rape in the Third Degree, O.R.S. § 163.355 and one 
count of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, O.R.S. § 163.425. The Petitioner has been fulfilling the 
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requirement to register as a sex offender in the State ofldaho. Upon his relocation to Nez Perce County, 
State of Idaho, Petitioner did dutifully register with the State of Idaho. 
On June 2, 2015, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Release from Registration Requirements and 
Expungement of Record. Two months later, on August 5, 2015, the Idaho State Police Bureau of 
Criminal Identification (hereinafter "Agency") issued an Agency's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender Registration. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Final Order, the Agency concluded that the crimes committed by Mr. Knox in Oregon were 
substantially equivalent to those found in I. C. § 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child under 
Sixteen. 
On September 4, 2015, Mr. Knox filed a petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-5270(3), of the Agency's August 5, 2015 Final Order where an equivalency determination 
was made by it and under the legislative grant of authority provided to the Agency under Idaho Code 
§ 18-8304 and Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure 11.10.03.12, et seq. Mr. Knox filed the petition 
for Judicial Review on the basis that the Agency's final order was enacted through unlawful procedure 
and was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In response, the Agency filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Petition for Judicial Review on September 17, 2015. 
A hearing on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss was held on June 21, 2016. After oral arguments 
and supplemental briefing submitted by both Mr. Knox and the Agency, this Court rendered its decision 
on July 22, 2016 and denied the Agency's Motion to Dismiss based upon the Agency's failure to 
properly effect service of the Final Order to Mr. Knox's counsel as required under Idaho Rule of 
Administrative Procedure 04.11.01.055.04. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ( hereinafter "IDAP A") governs and outlines the rules 
governing sex offender registry. Specifically, the Rules Governing Sex Offender Registry, 11.10.03, 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 




























outline that the Central Registry's equivalency detennination is an agency action as defined by Chapter 
52, Title 67, Idaho Code.IDAPA11.10.03.0S(c). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act also addresses the judicial review of Agency 
equivalency determinations and specifically states that judicial review of the agency's decision shall be 
made in accordance with Chapter 52, Title 67 of the Idaho Code. See, ID APA 11.10.03.08( c )(i). 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. § 
67-5270. Therefore, a court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's 
statutory authority; are made upon ( d) are not supported by substantial 
in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. l.C. § 67-5279(3). Moreover, 
a court may overturn an agency's decision without a finding of (a) through (e) above, when substantial 
rights of an appellant have been prejudiced. Due process rights are "substantial rights" for purposes of 
ID APA provision stating that an "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced." Eddins v. Cityo/Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36,244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the IDAPA is:"' ... if the agency is not affirmed, it shall be 
set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code §67-
5279(3). 
ARGUMENTS 
A. THE AGENCY'S FINAL ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF MR. KNOX WERE PREJUDICED WHEN THE AGENCY 
FAILED TO PROVIDE MR. KNOX DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO IT'S ISSUANCE OF A FINAL 
ORDER THAT HAS THE FULL FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW. 
1. Mr. Knox Was Not Afforded Due Process. 
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Due process is a pillar of our judicial system. Due process of law guarantees no particular form 
of procedure; it protects substantial rights. See, Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,610, 94 S.Ct. 
1895, 1901, 40 L.Ed.2d 406,415 (1974). In fact, where a party demonstrates that it's due process rights 
have been violated by an agency's actions, the party has similarly demonstrated that a substantial right 
has been prejudiced for the purpose of Idaho Code Section 67-5270(3 ). Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 
Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). 
It is a fundamental concept that even in an administrative law proceeding, people have due 
process protection and an administrative tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected 
party fair notice providing him a full opportunity to rneetthe issue. Hernandez v. Phillips, 
41 Idaho 779,781, 118 P.3d 111,113 (2005); White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 ldaho 784,786,572 
P.2d 887,889 (1977). In a situation where a final order is the resultant agency action, such situation is 
defined as a "contested case." Defined as such, contested cases under Idaho Code § 67-5242 are 














place, and nature of the hearing; a statement of the legal authority under which the hearing is to be held; 
and a short and plain statement of the matters asserted or the issues involved. As such, notice is rightfully 
considered to be a critical aspect of due process to be afforded in any administrative process. Grindstone 
Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Tdaho 860, 865, 574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). The essentials 
of due process permit administrative regulation only by adherence to the fundamental principles of 
constitutional government. The legislature must appropriately prescribe standards of administrative 
action. The quasi-judicial action thus prescribed, must faithfully observe the 'rudiments of fair play'. A 
fair and open hearing is the absolute demand of all judicial inquiry. In the field of administrative 
regulation it is not only vital to the validity of the regulation imposed; it is vital 'to the maintenance of 
public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process'. Morgan v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. 773, 775, 82 L.Ed. 1129; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities 
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Commission, 301 U.S. 292,304,305, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093; Sabre v. Rutland Railroad Co., 86 
Vt. 347,355,369, 85 A. 693." Petition ofNew England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 136 A.2d 357,362 
(Vt.l 957). Appurtenant to the right to notice is the right to be fairly notified as to the issues to be 
considered. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 ldaho 860,865,574 P.2d 902,907 
(1978). Lastly, under Idaho Code§ 67-5242 (3)(b), at the hearing, the presiding officer shall afford all 
parties the opportunity to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved, except as 
restricted by a limited grant of intervention or by a pre-hearing order. 
In the case at bar, the first notification of any action to be undertaken by the Agency, let alone 
a completed action, was Knox a copy of Agency's August 5, 2015 
in the mail. That is to say, neither Mr. Knox, nor his attorneys ofrecord were ever notified of a pending 
Agency action prior to the issuance of a final order. It was only during the oral argument on June 21, 
2016 hearing on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss that it is now known that Mr. Knox's original Petition 
for Relief from the registration requirement (filed in Nez Perce County Case Number CV 5-000 010), 
was the triggering event that initiated the Agency's action in this matter. Furthermore, the Agency's oral 
argument also provided new infonnation to Mr. Knox in that an the hearing was conducted by the 
Agency's Equivalency Board (hereinafter "Equivalency Board"), which was established in 2012. While 
Yet the administrative procedure that the Equivalency Board followed remains unknown. Mr. Knox 
was preciuded from presenting argument and evidence in response to the Agency's action. The 
Agency's Final Order was based upon unlawful procedure and violated Mr. Knox's due process rights. 
Under Eddins v. City oj Lewsiton, due process rights are "substantial rights" for purposes of the IDAP A 
provision stating that an "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have 
been prejudiced." Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36,244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). Therefore, 
because substantial rights of Mr. Knox were prejudiced, the Agency's Final Order must be reversed. 
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1. The Statutory Framework for Equivalency Determination in Idaho Presents Significant 
Constitutional Shortcomings. 
An equivalency determination of out-of-state offenses is based on the provisions of Idaho's 
Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right to Know Act (hereinafter referred to 
as "Registration Offenders convicted of offenses that are "substantially 
to certain specified Idaho crimes who move to Idaho to establish residency are eligible for an 
equivalency determination. l.C. § 18-8304(1 )(b ). Mr. Knox, upon relocating to Idaho in 2003, was one 
of the offenders who required an equivalency determination. While an equivaiency determination was 
made in 2003, there is no information with regards to how the determination was made. Rather, it was 
only by looking at Mr. Knox's profile on the Sex Offender Registration website that information about 
the equivalency is gained. Idaho provides a computerized sex offender registry that is accessible to the 
public via the internet complete with photos of all sex offenders, along with their personal information 
including name, address, date of birth, and offense history. LC. § 18~8323. 
Prior to 2012, there was no Equivalency Board. Prior to 2012, there were no IDAPA rules 
governing the equivalency determination. As such, and even now, there are significant constitutional 
shortcomings in the statutory procedure as a result of the lack of procedural due process afforded an 
offender. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515,519 (1971). "[C]ertainly where 
the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play." Id (holding that 
state's designation of an individual as "habitual drunkard" attaches a badge of infamy, requiring the state 
to provide due process protections before applying such an unsavory label) ( citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 
344 U.S. 183, 191, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216, 222 (1952)). 
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The Equivalency Board is charged with the duty of determining if a person's out-of-jurisdiction 
conviction is substantially equivalent or similar to an Idaho sex related offense, as defined by Idaho's 
criminal Code, for the purposes of requiring a person to register in Idaho. ID APA 11.10.03.08(b). While 
the duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime, 
an equivalency determination is based upon a factual determination of conduct, i.e., that the offense 
convicted of a different jurisdiction is substantially similar to a specific Idaho sex offense. This 
distinguishes Idaho's equivalency determination method from a sex offender registry based solely on the 
fact of conviction of a predicate offense. As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded sex offender registration not violate the offender's procedural process rights, 
noting the offender "has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest" the charge. 
Conn. Dep'to/Pub. Safetyv. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7,123 S.Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L.Ed.2d 98, 105 (2003); see 















As to due process, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
"Procedural due process basically requires that a person, whose protected 
rights are being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely 
manner. There must be notice and the opportunity to be heard must occur at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 371, 179 P.3d 323,334 (2008) 
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,969, 703 P.2d] 342, 1344 
(1985); Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006); 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999)). 
In spite of the existence of well-established standards of procedural due process, Idaho's statutory 
scheme for an equivalency determination, as established in 2012, prevents and minimizes, at every tum, 
the possibility that an offender has the constitutionally required notice and opportunity to be heard. Prior 
to the Equivalency Board's hearing, the offender is not notified of the hearing and is not notified of the 
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information being relied upon. The offender is not provided notice or oppmiunity to be heard before the 
Equivalency Board or any other opportunity to be heard prior to determination. The offender is given 
his first opportunity to be heard only if he can persuade the district court upon judicial review of the 
Equivalency Board's decision. In the event that the offender clears this threshold hurdle, he then bears 
the burden of disproving the propriety of the equivalency determination. 
There is a legitimate state interest in making an equivalency determination. However, the United 
States Constitution prohibits the state from doing so without affording the offender due process. It is Mr. 
Knox's position that Idaho's statutory scheme violates an offender's right to procedural due process by 
failing to and an opportunity to be ata time and a meaningful manner 
prior to the Agency rendering a final action that has the force and effect of law. As such, is a 
constitutional violation. 
B. THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN 
MADE A REDETERMINATION OF AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
In 1998, Idaho enacted the "Sexual Offender Registration and Notification and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (hereinafter referred to as "Registration Act"), Idaho Code§§ 18-8301 to 18-8326. 
Ch. 411, § 2, 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 1275, 1276-90 by the Idaho Legislature through the Idaho 1998 
Session Laws in the Second Regular Session of the 54th Legislature. The Registration Act applied to 
persons who entered the state on or after July 1, 1993, and who had been convicted of any crime in 
another state that is substantially equivalent to the following offenses as listed in subsection (l)(a), LC. 
§§ 18-909, 18-911, 18-1506, 18-1506A, 18-1507, 18-1507A, 18-1508, 18-1508A, 18--4003(d), 
18--4116, 18--4502, 18--4503, 18-6101, 18-6108, 18-6602, 18-6605, and 18-6608 of this section. LC. 
§ 18-8304(1 )(b ). In 2005, the legislature added another category of sex offender who was required to 
register under the Act. Ch. 233, § 1, 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 710, 711. Section 18-8304 was amended 
to apply to any person who was convicted of a crime that was substantially equivalent to the crimes set 
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forth in subsection (l)(a) and who was required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction when 
the person entered Idaho to establish permanent or temporary residence. Idaho Code § 18-8304(1 )( c ). 
State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505, 506, 236 P.3d 1265, 1266 (2010). Notably, the tenn "substantially 
equivalent" was present and applicable at the outset of the legislation in 1998. 
With respect to the equivalency determination made by the Agency under the legislative grant 
of authority provided to it under Idaho Code § 8-8304(1 )(b) and ldaho Rule of Administrative 
Procedure 11.10.03.12 et seq., Mr. Knox's argues that the Agency's final order was arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Specifically, that an equivalency determination was made with 
to Mr. Knox's Oregon offenses in 2003, and immediately upon the notification of petitioner's 
relocation to Nez Perce County, State ofldaho. The Agency cannot now, nearly twelve years later, come 
back with a redetermination following notification of Mr. Knox's petition for relief of the registration 
requirement. 
Based upon the argument of the Agency at the June 21, 2016 hearing on the Petition for Judicial 
Review, it is now known that Mr. Knox's original Petition for Relief from the registration requirement 
filed in Nez Perce County Case Number CV15-0001010, was the catalyst that initiated the Agency's 
action as accomplished through the hearing conducted by the Agency's Equivalency Board (hereinafter 
"Equivalency Board"). The same oral argument also provided the information that the Equivalency 
Board was established in 2012. The administrative procedure the Equivalency Board followed remains 
unknown. 
At issue here is simply whether or not the Agency can make a redetermination of equivalency 
using the most current statutory language following the 2012 creation of the Equivalency Board to an 
offender who had out of state offenses duly equivalated to Idaho offenses at the time of his relocation 
within the jurisdiction and where the original equivalency was made prior to the creation of the 
Equivalency Board. On December 17, 2002, in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the 
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County of Multnomah, under Case No. 02-05-33157, Mr. Knox was convicted of two offenses that 
required his participation in the offender registry program in the State of Oregon. Upon his relocation 
to Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, in 2003, the Mr. Knox did dutifully register with the State of Idaho 
Central Registry as required under Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(b), which states: 
(1) "Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in section 
18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve 
(12) years of age); 18-4003( d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 
18-6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-6101(1) where the victim is at least twelve 
( 12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 
(male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object). 
Idaho Code 18-8304(1 
that time, in 2003, and in conjunction with Idaho Code 18-8304(] )(a), the State ofldaho 
determined that the first of Mr. Knox's two convictions the State of Oregon was equivalent to a 
conviction under Idaho Code§ 18- 508. With regard to Mr. Knox's second of two convictions in the 
State of Oregon, in 2003 the State ofldaho, pursuant to Idaho Code 18-8304(1 )(b) and in conjunction 
with Idaho Code 18-8304(l)(a), determined that Mr. Knox's second conviction in the State of Oregon 
was equivalent to a conviction under Idaho Code § 18-6101. 
It is especially important to note that neither of the two convictions that required Mr. Knox's 
participation with the offender registry were deemed an 'aggravated offense" as it was defined by Idaho 
Code 18-8303 in 2003 when the above referenced equivalency determinations were made. Specifically, 
the Oregon conviction that was determined to be equivalent to a conviction under Idaho Code 18-1508 
is not an included offense under the controlling definition under Idaho Code 18-8303(1 ), where under 
the statutory language in 2003 was, as follows: 
(1) "Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in section 
18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve 
(12) years of age); 18-4003(d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 
18--6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-6101(1) where the victim is at least 
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twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 
18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use ofa foreign 
object). 
Idaho Code 18-8303(1) as of Ch. 194, § 3, 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws 659,661. 
Also, at the time the 2003 equivalency determination and and under the facts of Mr. Knox's 
Oregon conviction, the equivalency lent itself to the application of the express exclusion as an 
aggravated offense because under subsection § 18-8303(1) excluded from the definition of aggravated 
offense those convictions under I.C. §18-6101(1) where the victim was over 12 years of age. Because 
the victim in petitioner's Oregon convictions was 15 years old, it clearly met the "at least 12 years of 
age" limitation and therefore squarely within exception to the aggravated offense definition. 
Upon review of the Idaho case law, it appears this matter is one of first impression to an Idaho 
court. However, it remains Mr. Knox's position that making a secondary equivalency determination 
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion where there has been no explanation as to why the 
2003 equivalency determinations are not controlling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court upon review should reverse the findings of the Agency and remand the matter back 
with instructions to vacate the Final Order Purporting to Establish a new equivalency determination of 
Mr. Knox's Oregon offenses. 
DATED THIS day of October, 2016. 
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On August 5, 2015, the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry ("SOR'') issued a declaratory order 
in this case pursuant to IDAHO CODE§§ 18-8304(1)(b), 18-8304(4) and Idaho Administrative Code 
11.10.03.12 et seq The SOR determined that Petitioner's ("Mr. Knox") 2002 foreign sex offense 
convictions of Rape in the Third Degree, O.R.S. § 163.355 and Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, 
O.R.S, § 163.425 were substantially equivalent to IDAHO CODE§ 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen. 
identifies two major disputes with the SOR's agency uction; first, Mr, Knox alleges that 
his substantial rights were prejudiced, i.e. his rights to due process are "substantial rights" for the 
purposes of the IDAPA provision stating that an agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights 
of the appellant have been affomed. Knox Opening Brief, p. 3.11. 2 -23. Secondly, Mr. Knox states 
that the SO R's determination was made in an arbitrary or capricious manner, Knox Opening Brief, p, 8, 
However, the SOR's comparison of Oregon and Idaho's statutes leads to the reasonable 
conclusion that it correctly determined Mr. Knox's convictions were substantially equivalent to lDAHO 
CooE § 18-1508. The agency's action is further suppo11ed by Idaho's case law that holds, a sex 
offender's right to due process is protected dudng the un.dedying criminal proceeding and the retroactive 
application ofIDAHO CODE§§ 18-8303(1) and 18-8310(1) is not in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2002, Mr. Knox was charged and convicted of two sexual offenses, Rape in the Third Degree, 
O.R.S. § 163.355 and Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, O.R.S. § 163.425. R. # 3; Criminal History 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF Page 1 
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Mr. Knox's sex offense charges arose when he engaged in sexual contact with a n:linor child. R. 
# 2, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office Incident Report, Custody Report and Numerous Special Reports. 
At the time of the sex offenses, Mr. Knox was age 23 and his victim was age 15. R, #2, p, 1 of 26. 
Also at the time Mr. Knox was convicted, the relevant language of the statutes he was convicted 
under read ew follows: 
(l) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse 1n the SECOND degree 
when that person subjects another person to sexual intercourse, deviate 
sexual intercourse ot, except as provided in ORS 163.412, penetration of 
the vagina, anus or penis with atty object other than the penis or mouth of 
the actor and the victim does not consent thereto. (2) Sexual abuse in the 
SECOND degree is a Class C felony. 
See attached, Appendix 1. 1 Cf R. #4, Oregon Revised Statute§ 163.425 (1992~ 
2009), p. 1 of 2; and, 
(1) A person commits the cthne ofrape in the third degree if the person 
sexual intercourse with another person underl 6 years of age. (2) Rape 
in the third degree is a Class C felony. 
R #5, Oregon Revised Statute§ 163-355 (1992-present), p. l of 1. 
In 2003, Mr. Knox who was still on probation for the sex offense conviction entered the state of 
Idaho to begin residency in Lewiston. R. #1. He registered as a sex offender with the Nez Perce Co'l..m.ty 
Sherifr s Office at the time and self-reported that he had been convicted of Sex Abuse III (not II) and 
Rape III.2 Id Mr. Knox did not provide any statutory citations for the sex offenses fot which he was 
c(lnvicted, 
In comparison to the relevant Oregon statutes, IDAHO CODE § 18~ 1508 states; 
1 Apparently tho historical language found on the SORNA Portal is it10orrect according to Oregon's Session Laws. The SOR 
is providing the correct statutory language, which can be judicially noticed by this Court and is provided as a courtesy copy 
in Appendix I. 
2 Sex Abuse in the Third Degree is apparently classified as a lesser offense than Second Degree. 
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a pel'son is guilty of lewd conduct with a minor child when he has genital to genital 
col'l.tact, or manual to genital contact or manual anal contact, with the ir1,tent of 
gratifying the sexual desires of either party, R. #7. 
IDAHO Cona § 18-8304(l)(b) requires a person convicted of a sex of1llnse in a foreign 
jurisdiction to register in Idaho, if that conviction is for a sex offense that is substantially equivalent to a 
sex offense entune:ta.ted in Idaho sex offense statutes. R. #9, 10 and 11. 
On August 5, 2016 the SOR issued a decla1·atory ruling and determined the two Oregon sex 
offense statutes) that Mr. Knox was convicted of, were substantially eqiiivalent to IDAHO CODE § 18-
1508. R. #11. Because Mr, Knox had manual to genital (as well as possibly genital to genital) contact 
with his victim, at the time he committed the sex offense, Mr, Knox is ineligible from the registration 
requirement in Idaho pmsuant to IDAHO CODE§ 18-8303(1). R. #11. 
Mr. Knox moved for declaratory relief and also sought judicial review from the SOR's 
determination on September 41 2016. R. #12 and 13. 
The SOR filed a Motion to Dismiss, contesting Mr. Knox's motion and petition as untimely hy 
stating the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to IRCP 84(n), R. # 14 
Mr. Knox objected to the SOR's Motion to Dismiss, R. # 15. 
On July 22, 2016 the Court entered its' Opinion and Order on the SOR's Motion to Dismiss, 
allowing Mr. Knox to proceed with his Petition for Judicial Review. R. #17. 
On August 18, 2016 the SOR filed the (settled) agency record with the Court. 
III. ISSUES ON PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. THE AGENCY•s FINAL ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF MR. KNOX WERE PREJUDICED WHEN THE 
AGENCY FAILED TO PROVIDE MR. KNOX DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO ITS 
ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER THAT HAS THE FULL FORCE AND EFFECT 
OF LAW. 
B. THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS ORAN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
RESPONDENT'S BRlEF Page3 
80
-------· l 
10/31/2016 MON 17107 
RECEIVED 10/31/2016 16:03 2087993070 
FAX 208 884 7290 Idaho State Police 
~lPC AUDITDF:'.:; DFFICE 
lizj011/04Z 
WHEN IT MADE A REDETERMINATION OF EQUIV ALENCY WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
IDAHO CODE § 67 "5279 controls the Court's review of an administrative action in a case such as 
The statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) The comt shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by othet 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or..,._,-.,,.,.,..,.,,, are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon 1..mlawful procedure; 
(d) not suppmted by substantial evidence on the recotd as a whole; or 
(c) arbitrary, capricious; or an abuse of discretion. 
(4) An agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights the appellant 
have been prejudiced. 
Or in the alternative: 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for fiuther proceedings as necessary. 
The courts in Idaho have held, "[b ]efore a district court may exercise judicial review of an 
agency decision, there must be a statute granting a right ofreview. See, In re City ofShelley, 151 Idaho 
289, 292 (2011). Once a tight ofreview has been established, the agency's factnal determinations are 
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 1011g as 
the determinations a.re supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine 
County, ex rel. Bd of Comm 'ts, 134 Idaho 353,357 (2000); Marshall v. Idaho Dep't 0/Ttemsp, 1 137 
Idaho 337, 340 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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Even then, an agency's actions are afforded a strong presumption of validity ... [and] "(t]his Court 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on factual ni.atters," 
Id IDAHO CODB § 67-5279 (1 ). Cooper v. Bd. of Prof'l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 
449, 454 (2000). 
Fmihermore, the "party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred 
in a manner specified in IDAHO Com:§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has 
prejudiced.'' Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429 (1998); Marshall, 
137 Idaho at 340. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and 
remanded proceedings as necessary." IDAHO CODE§ 67-5279(3). 
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
A. THE AGENCY'S DECLARATORY ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF MR. KNOX WERE PREJUDICED WHEN THE AGENCY 
FAILED TO PROVIDE MR. KNOX DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO ITS ISSUANCE OF A 
FINAL ORDER THAT HAD THE FULL FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW. 
The SOR disagrees the characterization of issue presented above. In light of statutory 
law, administrative tu.le-making and case law authority, Mr. Knox did not have a substantial right 
prejudiced when the SOR determined his registration requirement in Idaho, based upon his criminal sex 
offense convictions in Oregon. As set forth below and as seen by a lack of evidence in the agency 
record, Mr. Knox's above~named claim is without merit and the agency's detem1ination should be 
upheld. 
Even though Mr. Knox lists three sub-issues in his brief, they are inclusive within the ultimate 
issue on appeal. In other words, is the SOR's determination that Mr. Knox's sex offense convictions in 
Oregon are substantially equivalent to IDAHO CODE§ 18~1508, supported by legal authority and the 
agency record? 
Each of Mr. Knox's issues will be addressed in the order as they appem· in his brief. 
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To begin, Mr. Knox essentially claims that he was deprived of procedural due process by the 
SOR's administrative proceeding. Knox Brief ... pp. 3-5. Mr. Knox cites various authorities for his 
proposition, but they arc distinguishable front Idaho's case law regarding due process and sex offender 
registration. The Idaho Court of Appeals, recently he[d: 
Both the duty to register and eligibility to seek an exemption from the duty to register are 
triggered "simply by reason of conviction for a specifi.ed crime,'' Moteover, designating an 
offense an "aggravated offense" does not affix any "badge of infamy" because it is a 
classification of the offense, not the offender ... Finally, Groves was afforded procedural 
due process prior to his conviction. For these reasons. Groves was not entitled to additional 
procedural due process. 
Groves v. State, 156 Ida.ho 552, 558 (2014) (adopting the reasoning in Johnson v. State) 
152 Idaho , 46 (2011) that the 2009 amendments (outlining which offenses are 
considered aggravated for registxation purposes) do not attach additional notoriety to 
[Jolmson's] registration status, but rather, just affect his ability to petition for exemption. 
Thus} he has not been deprived of due process). 
The United States Supreme Court has also held, where the registry requirement is based on 
the fact of a previous conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness, due process does not 
require an opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. 
Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (March 5, 2003). 
Like the cases of Groves, Johnson and Doe, Mr. Knox's duty to register in Idaho was simply 
triggered by his sex offense convictions in Oregon for second degree sexual abuse and rape of a fifteen 
year-old victim. The terms and conditions of sex offender registration in Idaho, is merely dictated by 
what is essentially a comparison of statutory laws between Idaho and Oregon. 
The due process that Mr. Knox argues for is unwarranted when determining whether or not a 
foreign sex offense conviction is substantially equivalent to a sex offense in Idaho. In other words he 
essentially seeks a "do-over," i.e. whether or not the facts support a conviction of the underlying 
criminal charge(s) that are the underlying cause for sex offender registration in Idaho. Furthermore, the 
pi-actical effect of Mr. Knox's position may constitute a collateral attack on the final judgment of his 
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criminal sex offense convictions in Oregon. Mr. Knox, akin to Gtoves, was afforded procedural due 
process prior to pleading guilty to the Oregon seK offense charges of second degree sexual abuse and 
third degree rape. 3 
Notably, "[a] valid guilty plea, voluntarily and understandingly given, is a judicial admissiM of 
all facts charged by the indictment or information." State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 673, 587 P.2d 305, 
308 (1978), citing Clarkv. State, 92 Idaho 827,832,452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969): see State v. Jacbon, 96 
Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975). 
Dy pleading guilty, Mr. Knox thereby admitted to penetrating the victim's vagina with an object 
(his finger) other than his mouth or penis1 per ORS 163 .425. Additionally by pleading guilty to rape in 
the third degree, Mr. Knox also admitted that he had sexual intercourse, per ORS 163.355, with a person 
under 16 years of age. 
Both ORS sex offense statutes are written broadly enough to contain the elements found in 
IDAHO CODE § 18~ 1508 supra p. 3, lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. In othel' words, Mi:. 
Knox admitted to; having 1nanual to genital contact and genital to genital contact with his victim, who 
was under 16 years of age at the time of the offenses. Thus, the elements between the Idaho and Oregon 
sex offense statutes are plainly met. 
Mr. Knox appears to claim that due process is a right unto itself. Tb.is is a clear misapplicatio11 
of law. Again, Mr. Knox disregards the body of constitutional case law which holds due process is 
triggered only in cases involving recognized rights; i.e. life, liberty and property. In both Connecticut 
Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe and Groves, the courts held a sex offender has no procedural due process 
right, based upon a protected interest such as liberty, in instances where the registration requirement 
arises merely from a conviction of a sex offense. 
3 See attached Appendix 2, Multnomah County, Judgment of Conviction and Sentence of Travis Knox which should have 
been attached to R. # 10 but was inadvertently omitted. 
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But even then, in cases hwolving a protected interest such as property~ due process may be 
curtailed depending on particular circumstances. See e.g. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 215 
PJd 494, 501 (Idaho 2009) (quoting "The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a 
pre-deprivation hearing (of property) is required in all cases." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,540, 101 
S.Ct. 1908, 1915, 68 L.Ed,2d 420,431 (1981) (ovenuled on other grounds)). "Interim suspensions of 
licenses and temporary seizures of property may be undertaken without a pre-deprivation hearing, 
provided there is sufficient factual basis for the action and that prompt administrative or judicial review 
of the merits of the decision is available." Bany v, Barch/, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649, 61 
L.Ed.2d 365, 374 (1979)). 
In light of the courts' directives above, Mr, seemingly does not have a protected interest 
procedutal due process. This is because Mr. Knox's registration requirement (here in Idaho) is based 
solely upon his conviction for two sex offenses in the state of Oregon. Nevertheless Mr, Knox is assured 
thrnt1gh the process of judicial review, that the SOR's determination of his registration requirement is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
J\,fr, Knox's assertion, that the agency's actions are somehow disingenuous with regard to the 
timing of the issuance of its final order, is without support in the record, Indeed, if the agency had 
allegedly made the determination in 2003, then Mr. Knox is truly barred by the loss of subject matter 
jurisdiction before the Court now, The record does not indicate how or even if a determination was 
made in 2003. What the record does show is that Mr. Knox. self-reported to the Nez Perce Cotinty 
Sheriff on his initial registration forms that he was convicted, albeit wrongly of Sexual Abuse in the 
Third Degree (it should have been repol'ted by Mt, Knox as Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree) and 
Rape in the Third Degree. R. # 1. 
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In faimess, the SOR issued its declaratory order to allow Mr. Knox to seek judicial review of that 
order in a contemporaneous manner with the petition for release from the registration requirement. 
Furthermore, the fact that the SOR, s determination of his registration requirement was issued when it 
was1 shows little if any harm, for the following reasons: 
l) Idaho's registration statutes or the IDAP A rules for the SOR do not give a specific date by 
when a declaratory order must be issued for these types of determinations, Clearly a declal.'atory order, 
issued contemporaneously in conjunction with a petition for relief from the registration requirement, 
seems more equitable. Especially in light of the sex offender self~reporting a foreign sex~offense 
conviction in 2003. A contemporaneous declaratory order not only allows a sex offender to seek judicial 
review of the SOR's determh1ation of substantial equivalency; but it also comports with the elements 
tequh'ed in IDAHO CODE§ 67-5279(3) and (4); and allows for the development ofa full agency record. 
2) Had the SOR not been authorized to conduct this determination, the determination would fall 
upon the Court either; 
a. when the offender enters the state and the Court would make the determination at that time, or; 
b. the determination would be made at the same time that a petition for release from the 
registration requirement was sought. In such a situation as this, the SOR or the county prosecutor's 
office, would have raised the same objections against release (i.e. Mr. Knox's Oregon sex offense 
conviction(s) are substantially equivalent to IDAHO Coon§ 18-1508). 
Mr. Knox claims that there was a hearing conducted by the agency's f'Equivalency Boardt 
which was established in 2012, which he should have been allowed to participate in and the 
administrative procedure followed by the Board remains unknown, Knox Brief, p, 5, Such claims are 
merely an attempt to mirror the facts found in Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009) to support a dlte 
process violation claim. There is nothing in the record to s1.ipport there was a Equivalency Board 
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making a factual determination of Mr. Knox!s case that would label him as a Violent Sexual Predator. 
(emphasis added), In Smith! the Sex Offender Management Board (a completely separate state entity 
from the SOR) was found to have run afoul of a sex offender's liberty interest, when it was making 
detenninations (labeling) that certafa sex offelidets were "violent sexual predators." 
No matter how Mr. Knox's claims arc phrased, it is undeniable that his case and Smith are 
plainly distinct from one another in at least one important way, The holding of Smith is discussed at 
length in the already cited case of Groves v. State. The Groves Court concluded, " the holding in Smith 
regarding the [labeling of a sex offender] is inapposite ... as the [Smith] Court distinguished 'the duty to 
1·egister as a sex offender' from being designated a 'violent sexual predator' because the former is 
triggered simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime ... and because an offender was provided 
due process to dispute that charge pdor to his conviction, he is not entitled to additional due process."' 
Furthermore, Mr. Knox clearly misaligns the argument presented by the SOR during the June 21, 
2016 oral axgun1ent No such hearing (as alleged by Mr. Knox) was ever conducted, nor was it 
conducted by an "Equivalency Board." No such board even exists within the ISP or the Bureau of 
Criminal Identification (that the SOR resides under). The SOR, pursuant to IDAHO CODE§ 18-8304(4) 
and IDAHO CODE § 67-5255, lawfully engaged in issuing a declaratory order when determining Mr. 
Knox's regist:ratkm, requirement, based upon bis sex offense conviction(s) in Oregon. That declaratory 
order is now subject to judicial review pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 67-5270 et seq. 
As stated above a statutory to statutory analysis, in determining what sex offense in Idaho ls 
substantially equivalent to those in Oregon, hardly necessitates a do-over type hearing that Mr. Knox 
seeks. Mr. Knox further claims he would have presented evidence and argument in response to the 
SOR's action. Knox Brief: p, 5. Mr. Knox does not state what type of evidence or argument it would 
have been. 
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Assuming arguendo that Mr. Knox was able to present evidence, what factual evidence could he 
have presented that would reverse his criminal conviction for the two sex offenses i11 Oregon's laws? 
What argument cotild Mr. Knox make that would amend the language in the Oregon Statutes (in place at 
the time) under which his sex offenses were charged and he was convicted? Without more, Mr. Knox's 
mere statement that he would have presented argument or evidence, docs not show nor create reversible 
error nor an act of arbitrariness on the part of the SOR 
1. The Statutory Framework for Eguivalency Determination in Idaho Presents Significant 
Constitutional Shortcomings. 
Herc Mr. Knox alleges because he was convicted of two sex offenses in Oregon that the analysis 
made by the SOR equating those offenses to IDAHO CODE§ 18~1508 is somehow defective and again 
claims his due process rights are substantial rights and those rights were prejudiced by the SOR's 
actions. Knox Brief, p. 5. Mr. Knox cites to Eddin v. City of Lewiston for support of this assertion. As 
set forth above, Groves v. State held when the registration requirement of a sex offender is ptedicated 
merely upon the criminal conviction, no additional due process is required. Id. at 558. In this case, 
is all that happened. Mr. Knox was convicted of two sex offenses in Oregon. The SOR looked at the 
statutes in Oregon where the conviction was entered. The SOR compared those statutes to Idaho's sex 
offense statutes in Title 18, It determined that Mr. Knox is required to register as a sex ommder because 
his sex offenses in Oregon are substantially equivalent to a sex offense in Idaho. Namely, IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-1508, 
In furtherance of his procedural due process claim, Mr. Knox contends that the statutory 
framework is substantively deficient from a constitutional standpoint. Knox Brief, #1, p. 6. There are 
several problems with Mr. Knox's further assertion. To begin, Mr. Knox fails to diffetentia.te between 
procedural due process and substantive due process, even though one is quite different from the other. 
Knox Brief, pp. 6-8. 
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On the one hand Mr. K.nox restates the agency has violated his procedural due process by not 
knowing what process the SOR used in its determination, Id. The SOR reiterates its argument from 
above for the sake of judicial economy. Moreover it should be noted that IDAPA Rules 11.10.03.12 et 
seq. spell out how the SOR makes its determinations in cases such as Mr. Knox's. Accordingly, the 
SOR also explains in its Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order how the determination 
was made (statutory to statutory analysis). R. #11. Therefore, Mr. Knox's assertion that the SOR 
looked only at his online profile, when making its determination is clearly without merit Especially 
considering that the agency record was submitted to this Comt. Knox Brief, p. 6, 11. 8-12. 
Then, Mr. Knox claims the statute is unconstitutionally It appears he is asserting 
IDAHO CODE § Uq;J04(1)(b) is problem, without stating succinctly what the problem is, if the 
statute is vague or unconstitutional as applied to him. As to this assertion by Mr. Knox, that there are 
significant constitutional shmtcomings the statutory procedure, Mr. Knox cites to the case of 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau.4 K..nox Brier: p. 6, 11. 17"24. 
Constantineau plainly does not apply to Mr. Knox's situation here. The following cases further 
refute Mr. Knox's position. As already noted in the SOR's responsive portion to procedural due 
process, the courts named-below hold there is no due process violation attached to a sex offender's 
registration requirement, arising from a me1·e sex offense conviction, 
In fact, no infirmity attaches until the state begins to single out and label a sex offender as a 
violent sexual predator, See Smith v. State 146 Idaho 822, 828 (2009) (concunfag,,, the United States 
Supreme Court has concluded that sex offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural 
due process rights, noting the offender "has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to 
4 In Constantineau, a woman was designated as a habitual drunkard without a hearing. Her name was posted in the area 
liquor stores to forbid sales of alcohol to her. Unlike Knox where th.ere was a prior criminal trial on the merits to support his 
sex offender registration requirement, the determination of Ms. Constanth1eau's publicly broadcast ban from alcohol sales by 
the Police ChiefofHartford was found deficient. 
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contest" the charge. Conn. Dep 't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S,Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 
L.Ed.2d 98, 105 (2003); see also Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2004). In reaching this 
conclusion, the Supten1e Cou1t emphasized that Connecticut's registry requfrement is "based on the foct 
of previous conviction ... ); See also State 11. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, (2011) (citing with approval, State v. 
Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 78 (2005) (tecognizing the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed many ofthe same 
arguments raised in Gragg, including contentions that sex offender registries effectively brand offenders 
with a "scarlet letter," make it impossible for a registrant to gain employment." And see Smith v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003) (stating [a]lthough the public availability of the information may have a 
painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences not 
registration dissemination provisions, the fact of the conviction itself. 
Moreover, "[t]he circuit courts that have considered this substantive due process argument 
regarding sex offender registries have upheld registration and publication requirements finding no 
constitutional infirmities." Doe v. Moore, 410 FJd 1337, 1345 (11th Cir.2005); See also Doe v. 
Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cfr.2004) (pet' curiam) (holding that persons convicted of serious sex 
offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from registration requirements). 
It is difficult to pinpoint if Mr. Knox is actually alleging that the statute as applied to him is 
unconstitutional or not. However, should that be his argument now, or in the future, Idaho's courts have 
addressed challenges to statutes and rnles alike, The Idaho Supreme Court held, [a] mle or regulation of 
a public administrative body ordinarily has the same force and effect oflaw and is an integral part of the 
statute under which it is made just as though it were prescribed in terms therein, The same principles of 
construction that apply to statutes apply to rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative body. 
Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,690, 604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979). The phraset rules and/or 
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regulations, as routinely used is basically synonyrnous and with the inclusion of statutes covers the 
entire authority of the agency in the area of regulation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, ''[t]his Court presumes the constitutionality of 
challenged statutes and we are obligated to seek an interpretation of the statute that upholds its 
constitutionality, American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 
869, 154 P.3d 433,440 (2007). The party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving it 
unconstitutional. Id. To succeed on a facial challenge, one mu.st demonsttate that u.nder no 
circumstances is the statute valid. St£1te v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). Dut, to 
prevail in an as-applied challenge, one must demonstrate only that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied in u specific instance. fochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,241,207 P.3d 963, 972 
(2009). 
In making the "as applied'' to me challenge, Mr. Knox attempts to paint the SOR's substantially 
equivalent determination as something other than what it really was or is. Knox Brief p, 7, lL l r 7, Mt. 
Knox asserts that the SOR based its dete:crnination solely upon the facts of his case. Id. This is either an 
incorrect assumption or wishful thinking on his part, but it is not a fact supported in the SOR's recotd, 
Even the SOR's own IDAPA rule pertaining to the substantially equivalency determination states 
that 
Substantially Equivalent or Similar' means any sex offense 1·elated crime, regardless of 
whether a felony or misdemeanor, that consists of similar elements defined in Title 
of the Iclaho Criminal Code. It does not mean exactly the same, nor exactly identical to. 
IDAPA 11.10.03.010.05, (emphasis added), 
Nowhere in this rule is it stated that the S!?'.R will do a purely factual inquiry when engaging in a 
substantially equivalent determination in Mr. Knox's case. Therefore, his claim that the statute 01· the 
rule as applied to him is constitutionally unsound is without merit. 
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Mr. Knox then reiterates his procedural due process arguments all over again, in his brief at page 
8. The SOR, having responded already to this claim, restates that the case law is not supportive of Mr. 
Knox's claim as argued above, 
The SOR merely engaged in a mechanical comparison between the elements of the sex-offense 
statutes (that Mr. Knox was convicted of) in Oregon1 and those offense(s) in Idaho, The Oregon statutes 
are written broadly enough to clearly contain the elements found in IDAHO CODE§ 18-1508. 
B. THE HEARING OFFICER,S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
DECISION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
WHEN IT MADE A REDERTMINATION OF EQUIVALENCY WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
Mr. Knox: claims the SOR made a redetel'mination of equivalency without authority to do so and 
thereby acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Knox Brief pp. 8-11. Such a claim is unsupported 
by the agency record and secondly, such a. claim works to Mr. Knox's detriment if a determination was 
actually made in 2003. 
If the SOR did :make a detennination in 2003, that Mr, Knox's sex. offense conviction(s) in 
Oregon were substantially equivalent to IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, lewd conduct with a minor under 16 
years of age, then clearly this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to review that agency action 
pursuant to IDAHO CODE§ 67-5273. And, Mr. Knox)s petition for judicial review must be dismissed 
accordingly. 
If in the alternative, Mr. Knox wishes to have the Court rule as to whether or not the SOR acted 
in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused its discretion in issuing a declaratory ruling on August 5, 
2015, the SOR states it acted with proper authority. Mr. Knox again asserts, in support of his claim, that 
the Agency's Equivalency Board made this redetermination and wha:t administrative procedure was 
followed is unknown. Knox Brief, p. 9, 11. 13~20. As the SOR argued above, it clearly sets fotth the 
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statutory procedure and allowed for, that it followed in its Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and 
Final Order rega1'ding his rngistmtion requfrcment. Because SOR did not classify Mr. Knox as a Violent 
Sexual Predator in this determination, but merely made a mechanical comparison of the two states' sex 
offenses i11 making its substantially equlvalent determination, a declaratory ruling subject to judicial 
review was the appropriate procedure. R. # 11. 
Mr. Knox goes on to make what is essentially an Ex Post Facto argument against SOR's 
finding that his substantially equivalent offense is considered an aggravated offense for registration 
pu11mses under a 2009 amendment to IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 18-8310. Knox Brief, bcgi1ming at 
p. 9, L 21 and going through p. 11, lL 1-9. 
Idaho's Appellate Courts are well versed in the amendmel'ltS to IDAHO CODE§§ 18-8303 and 18-
8310 and have addressed the issues of alleged rights of due process and ex post facto challenges to 
Idaho's sex offender registration laws time and again: See, Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 100-101, (l 999) 
(holding sex offender registration is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea. The purpose ofldaho's 
registration statute is not punitive, but remedial,); State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, (Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding Sexual Offender Registration and Notification and Community-Right-to-Know Act did not 
constitute ex post facto law; legislature intended the Act as a civil scheme, rather than criminal scheme, 
and the effects of the Act, which included public access to certain registry infonnation and posting of 
that information on the internet, were not so punitive as to override the legislative intent.); Smith v 
Stale, 146 Idaho 822 (2009) (concluding the duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by 
reason of conviction for a specified crime, but classification as a violent sexual predator (''VSP") is 
based upon a factual determination of probable foture conduct, i.e., that the offender poses a high risk of 
committing an offense or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.) State v. Johnson1 152 ldaho 41 (2011), 
determining inter alia, where a. legislative restl'iction is an incident of tho state's power to protect the 
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health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory 
power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment; and Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of 
Criminal Jdenttfication, 154 Idaho 182, (2013) (concluding ... the 2009 amendment is expressly 
declared to retroactive, we need not address whether applying the amendment to Mr. Bottum would, 
as he contends, attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past). 
It is worth noting that the Idaho Supreme Court found that ''The Court of Appeals opinion in 
Gragg is thoughtful and its holding is correct." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 45, (2011). Gragg, 
relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, (2003). 
no cogent reason why ldaho Supreme Court would depart from its' ofreasoning 
these cases, including reliance on Smith v. Doe, 
decisis, the SOR will rely upon the same. 
a. SORA is retroactive. 
The Idaho appellate courts have consistently held that the Sexual Offender Registration 
Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA), codified as IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 through 
18-8326, applies retroactively to persons who had been convicted of specified crimes before the statute 
was enacted. See, Ray 11, State1 133 Idaho 96, (1999); State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, (Ct. App, 2005); 
State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 (2011 ); Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, . , . 
154 Idaho 182 (2013) (SORA is expressly retroactive, therefore does not violate IDAHO CODE§ 73-101). 
Mr. Knox has not disputed that the holding of Smith v. Doe has been reversed or overtuled. 
b. SORA is not punitive. 
In Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Coui1: considered for the :fii:st time a claim that a sex 
offendel' l'egistration and notification law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court acknowledged th.at the framewotk for this 
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We must 0 asce1'tain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' 
proceedings." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,361, 117 $,Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 
(1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. 
If, however, the intention was ta et1act a regulatory scheme tha:t is civil and nonpunitive, 
we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is" 'so punitive either in purpose 
01' effect ac; to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civiJ,' ,, Ibid (quoting United States 
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 26361 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Because we 
uordinarily defer to the legislature's stated i11tent;' Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 
2072, " 'only the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transfonn 
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty i" Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.G"t. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 
249, 100 S.Ct. 2636); see also Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072; United States v. 
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); United States v. One 
Assortment of89 Fire.arms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). 
Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. at 1146-1147. 
In State v. Johnsoni the Idaho Supreme Court stated with approval, the Legislature's 
classification of Johnson's offense as an "aggravated. offense/' subsequent to his guilty plea, was an 
exception to the general understanding that SORA is non-punitive. As noted, the Idaho Supreme Court 
did not directly hold; whether SORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, Le.; whether despite the 
legislature's stated intent was remedial in nature; or whether the effects of SORA were so clearly 
put1itive that they overrode the Legislature's stated purpose. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45. 
Johnson did, however, unequivocally describe it placed its stamp of approval upon the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. Doe and the Idaho Coort of Appeals decision in State 11. 
Gragg (Ct.A pp. 2005). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Gragg, aligned its determination with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's 1-easoning in Smith v. Doe. The Smith Court made its ex post facto analysis of Alaska's 
sex offender registration law upon the seven factor 11intent-effects" test from Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). Mr. Knox has alleged some of these procedural due process 
issues above, however the Supreme Court disposes of his claims under the Kennedy-Mendoza seven 
factors test. 
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Even if Mr. Knox were to argue that Idaho's Constitution required a different result in his case, 
the Idaho Supreme Cottt!, in recognizing the uniqueness ofldaho's Constitution, held "Article I, § 16 of 
the Idaho Constitution provides, in relevant part: 'No ... ex post facto law ... shall ever be passed.' 
Similarly, Article I,§ 10, cl. l, of the UJ1ited States Constitution ptohibits a state from passing an 'ex 
post facto law.' 
Om state Supreme Court has recognized that the two constitutional provisions may not 
necessarily of the same scope or subject to exactly the same interpretation. See Quinlan v. Idaho 
Coinmtssionfor Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 731, 69 P.3d 146, 151 (2003); State v. Lindquist, 
99 ldaho 766,769,589 P.2d 101, 104 (1979). 
However, our appellate comts have traditionally the two constitutional provisions together 
without "recognition of the possibility of a difference in scope or analysi.:i," State v. Gragg, 1.43 Idaho 
74, 75,s As stated before, it is instrumental to note that the Idaho Supreme Court declared, "The Court 
of Appeals opinion in Gtagg is thoughtful and its holding is cortect." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 
45,266 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2011). 
1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
Mr, Knox may claim an affirmative disability or restraint upon him as follows: being restrained 
from changing residences or employment; fnrther registration coJnpels post discharge conduct 
(mandating registration, re-registration, disclosure of public and private information, and updating of 
that information) under threat of prosecution; the registration duties are significant and intrusive, 
because they compel offenders to contact law enforcement agencies and disclose information) sorne of 
5 Citing Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 77, 90 P.3d at 302; State v. O'Neill, ll 8 Idaho 244, 246-47, 796 P 2d l2 l, 123,~24 (1990); 
State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474,483,632 P.2d 663,672 (1981), ove1•ruled on other gro1md9 by SttJte v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 
757 P.2d 675 (1988); State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159,166,627 P.2d 788, 795 (1981); Wolfv. State, 99 Idaho 476,480, 583 
P.2d 1011, 1015 (1978); Statev. Nickenon, 132 Idaho 406, 411-12, 973 P 2d 758, 763--64 (Ct App, 1999): LaFon v. State, 
119 Idaho 387, 389, 807 P.2d 66, 68 (Ct.App.1991); Mellinger v. Idaho Department of Correction&, 114 Idaho 494, 498, 757 
P.2d 1213, 1217 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Scroggie, 110 Idaho 103,113,714 P.2d 72, 82 (Ct.App.1986); Almadav. State, 108 
Idaho 221, 224, 697 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Ct.App.1985)." 
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which is otherwise private, most of it for public dissemination; the time associated with SORA are 
intrusive, and that SORA exposes registrants, through aggressive public notification of thelr crimes, to 
profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism. 
Such claims if made by Mr. Knox are unpersuasive for three reasons. First, IDAHO CODE § 18-
8326, protects sex offenders from some of the harms listed above. Therefore, the statute balances the 
interests of the offender that of the state, 
Secondly, in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, the United States Supreme found this same type 
argument to be unpersuasive: 
Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of 
imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint. Hudson, 522 
U.S., at 104, 118 S,Ct 488, The Act's obligations are less harsh than the sanctions of 
occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive. See ibid (forbidding 
further participation in the banking industry); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct 
1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (forbidding work as a union official); Hawker v. New York, 
170 U,S, 189, 18 S,Ct 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (revocation of a medical license). The 
Act does not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change 
jobs or residences. 
The [9th Circuit] Court of Appeals sought to distinguish Hawker and cases which have 
followed it on the grounds that the disability at issue there was specific and ''rnmow,'' 
confined to particular professions, whereas "the procedures employed under the Alaska 
statute are likely to make [respondents] completely unemployable " because "employers 
will not want to risk loss of business when the public learns that they have hired sex 
offenders." 259 F.3d, at 988. This is conjecture. Landlords and employers could conduct 
background checks on the criminal records of prospective employees or tenants even with 
the Act not in force. The record in this case contains no evidence that the Act has led to 
substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not 
have otherwise occurred thwugh the use of routine background checks by employers and 
landlords. 
Although the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact 
on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the Act's registration and 
disseminatio11 provisions) but from the fact of co1wiction1 already a matter of public tecot·d, 
The State makes the facts underlying the offenses and the resulting convictions accessible 
so members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with 
the registrant. 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 100-101. 
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Finally, IDAHO CODE § § l 8~8 3 06 and 18~83 07, provides when and where a person convicted of a 
cettain type of sex offense must register. According to these statutes Mr. Knox is only required to 
appear in person before the county shed ff, of the county in which he tesides, once per year (unless he 
was to move). IDAHO CODE§ 18-8307(c). 
This Court should not only follow the holding of Smith v. Doe in fin.ding that any claim of 
disability or restraint made by Mr. Knox is without merit, and because the duty to register is nothing 
more than a slight imposition. And besides, there are consequences for those who engage in vigilantism 
against sex-offenders. 
Mr, Knox may also assert (if he has not yet already) that legislature created a new class of 
sex offenders by amending IDAHO CODE§ 18-8303(1), See, Knox's Btief~ pp, 9-J. L However; the state 
has not made a factual determination that Mr. Knox, as an individual sex offender, poses a high risk of 
committing an offense or wm engage in violent predatory sexual conduct (as was the case of the violent 
sexual predator designation Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 828). Mr. ¥,.nox's duty to register as a sex 
offender is triggered simply and exclusively by reason of his conviction of the specified crimes of 
Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree and Rape in the Third Degree of a minor under 16 years of age. 
Both crimes were found by the SOR to be substantially equivalent to Lewd Conduct With A Minor 
Under Sixteen, IDAHO CODE § 18-1508, a crime that the Idaho legislature has designated as an 
aggravated offense in 2009, and while Mr. Knox was still required to register as a sex offender. IDAHO 
CODE§ 18-8303(1). 
The Johnson Court farther cited with approval, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 at 92, when it 
discussed whether or not if the burden of a life-tin1e sex offender registration requfrement was in 
violation of an offe11der's right to due process. The Johnson Court stated: 
The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from makfr1g reasonable categotical 
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judgments that co11viction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory 
consequences.'1 Id. at 103, 123 S.Ct, at 1153, 155 L.Ed.2d at 184. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has dismissed ex post facto claims "imposing regulatory burdens on individuals convicted 
of crimes without any con-esponding risk assessment.'' Id. at 104, 123 S.Ct. at 1153, 155 
L.Ed.2d at 184. Moreover, "[t]be State's determination to legislate with respect to 
con\'icted sex offenders as a class, rather than requirt individual determination of 
their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause," Id. The fact that a sc:xual offender, convicted of a certain class of crime, may 
be required to register for life is not so punitive that it overrides SORA's regulatory 
purpose. This is particularly so because the Legislature need not make particularized 
findings in the regulatory context. 
State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45-46. (emphasis added). 
2. Sanctions that have historically been considered punishment; 
and 
3. Compari.son to probation or supervised release. 
Any additional claims by Mr. Knox that sex offender registration is punishment or comparable to 
probation or supervised release are wi1hout merit. 
Notably, the United State Supreme Co1.1rt rejected these arguments as well; 
Ptobation and supervised release entail a series of mandatory conditions and allow 
the supervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release in case of 
infraction. See generally Johnson v, United States, 529 U.S. 6941 120 S,Ct. 1795, 
146 L.Bd.2d 727 (2000); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 
L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). By contrast, offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to 
move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. 
Although registrants must infonn the authorities after they change their facial 
features (such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek psychiatric treatment, they 
are not required to seek permission to do so. A sex offender who fails to comply 
with the reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that 
failure, but any prosecution is a proceeding separate from the individual's original 
offense. 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 101-102. 
4. Traditional aims of punishment. 
Should Mr. Knox further argue that SORA determines who must register based not on a 
particularized determination of the risk the person poses to society, but rather on the criminal statute the 
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person was convicted of offending and that the "unlimited public dissemi11ation requirement provides a 
deterrent and retributive effect that goes beyond any non~punitive purpose that essentially setves the 
traditional goals of punishment. In other words, those who actually committed the same conduct and 
who may have plead to a lesser offense or whose convictions are overturned or who are acquitted do not 
have to register, despite having committed the same conduct, would indicate punishrnent over regulatory 
purposes. 
The United State Supreme Court unequivocally disposed of this potential argument as well: 
Any number of govermnental progtams might deter crime without imposing punishment. 
"To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions 'criminal' , . , 
would severely undem1ine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation." 
Hudson, supta, at 105, 118 S.Ct 488; see also Ursery, 518 U,S,, at 292, 116 S.Ct. 2135; 
89 ~Firearms, 465 U.S., at 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 
The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Act's tegistration 
obligations were retributive because "the length of the reporting tequirement appears to be 
measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the extent of the risk posed." 259 FJd, 
at 990. The Act, it is true, differentiates between individuals convicted of aggravated ot 
multiple offenses and those convicted of a single nonaggravated offrmse, Alaska Stat. § 
12.63.020(a)(l) (2000). The broad categories, however, and the corresponding length of 
the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is 
consistent with the regulatory objective. 
Smith v, Doe, 538 U.S. at 102. 
The same reasoning applies to the Idaho legislature's determination of which sex offense 
convictions are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism and that it is the convictions of these 
felony crimes that warrant requiring the convicted offender to register. See, lDAHO CODE § 18-8302. 
c, Mr. Knox Has Not Been Deprived of Any Rights. 
Mr. Knox claims that his primary focus, and allegation ofunconsthutionality, rely primarily 
upon the foct that the State of Idaho has taken away rights from him that he previously had the benefit of 
(i.e. he could have been able to be released from the registration requirement at the time he came into 
Idaho). Knox Briefp.9-11. And now his primary complaint for relief focuses upon the State ofidaho's 
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action in taking away alleged rights that had been previously granted (the ex post facto cluhn). Id 
As already argued by the SOR above, whether Mr. Knox has a right to due process protections, 
regarding his desire for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is eligible for release fl'om sex 
offender registration depends on whether his interest in being released from sex offender registration, is 
within the scope of the liberty or property language of U.S. Const, art. XIV, 
words, for Mr. Knox to assert a legitimate entitlement to due process with respect to 
some possibility that he be released from sex offender registration requirements, he must first establish 
an interest that triggers the requirement for due process. If he cannot ptove he has such an interest, it 
district court to grant Mr. Knox fill evidentiary 
Supreme Court addressed this issue Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfi:Ire 
ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,970 P.2d 14 (1998): 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation oflife, liberty, 
or property without 'fundamental fairness' thwugh govermnental conduct that offends the 
community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-48, 89 L.Ed.2d 4l0 (1986). 
*** 
To detem:iine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It must first decide whether 
the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth 
Antendment. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573,575,930 P.2d 603,605 (1996) (citing Smith 
v Meridian Joint Sch Dist. No 2,, 128 Idaho 714, 722, 918 P.2d 583, 591 (1996)); see 
also, True v. Dep'to/Health and Welfare, 103 Idaho 151,645 P.2d 891 (l982) (citing Goss 
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)), Only after a court finds a 
liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, in which it determines 
what process is due. Schevers v, State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 603, 605. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Comt, "[t]he requirements of proced\u·al due 
process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment1s prote<.-1ion ofliberty and property.'' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
569, 92 S,Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that property interests are "created ... by 
existing ntles .. , such as state law," Id Likewise, this Court has indicated that 
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"determination of whethex a particular right or privilege is a property interest is a matter of 
state law" Ferguson v. Bd. of Trustees of Bonner Cty. Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 564 P.2d 971, 
975 (1977) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)), 
Further, determining the existence of a liberty or prope1ty interest depends on the 
"construction of the releva.l'J.t statutes," and the "nature of the interest at stake." True, l 03 
Idaho at 154,645 P.2d 891 (citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law,§ 10-9, at 515-16 
(1978)). Hence, whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an 
examination of the particular statute or ordinance in question. Bishop, 426 U.S. 341, 96 
S.Ct 2074. 
A person must have more than an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to have a 
property interest therein. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564,569, 92 S,Ct. 2701. Fluther, that 
person must have more than a unilateral expectation the benefit; instead, she must have 
a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it" Id. at 577, 92 S,Ct 2701. 
Maresh, 132 Idaho at 225-227, 970 P.2d at 18~20, 
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security 
interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Maresch, 132 Idaho at 226, 970 P,2d at 
19, citing Board of Regents v. Roth 408 U.S. 564,576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
The language of IDAHO CODE§§ 18-8307 and 18-8310 begin with the presumption that sex 
offender tegisttation is for life. Moreover, IDAHO CooE § § 18-8303 and 18-8310 merely establishes a 
process by which an eligible sex offender may seek release from sex offender registration. They ptovjde 
what Mr. Knox must show in tem1s of his eviderrtiary burden to justify such release. The statutes do not 
cteate a liberty or property interest that Mr. Knox alleges he had already acquired in specific benefits 
when he was convicted and sentenced. 
Rather, Mr. Knox had only the hope of being released, "That hope is not a prope1iy right and the 
frustration of such a hope does not trigger the right to a hearing.n Maresch, 132 Idaho at 226-227, 970 
P.2d at 19-20, (citing Loebeck v. Idaho State Board of Education, 96 Idaho 459,461,530 P.2d 1149, 
1151 (1975) (quoting Perrin v. Oregon State Board of Education, 15 Or.App. 268,515 P.2d 409 
(1973)), 
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Therefore) IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 18u8310 created no legitimate claim of entitlement for 
Mr. Knox or any other registered sex offender to petition for release from sex offender registration. 
Because there is no right created in the law, the SOR acted properly by denying Mr. Knox an evidenfau:y 
hearing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing) SOR respectfully requests this Court to rule: 
1. That the SOR acted appropriately, based upon established legal authority and the agency 
record, when it determined that Mr. Knox's two sexual offenses in Oregon were substantially equivalent 
to lewd conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) as defined by Idaho sex offense law, 
2. That the agency record and Idaho's legal authority supports the SOR1s determination that 
Mr. Knox's sex: offense convictions that he pled guilty to, requires him to register for life in Idaho, 
3. That Mr. Knox's assertions are unsupported by legal authority, and are therefore without 
merit) and the SOR) as the prevailing party, should be awarded its attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
IDAHO CODE§ 12-117. _,+,, -~,~ 
Dated this _V __ day of October 2016. 
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.. , OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS 
second degree if the person penetrates the 
vapnn, 111us or penis of another with any 
obJect other than the penis or mouth of the 
a.ct.or md the victim is under 14 years of age. 
(2) Unlawful sexual penetration in the 
second degree is a Class B felony, [1981 c.549 
§2; 1989 c:.SIS!J §5; 1991 c.886 §ll 
UIS.AlO ~ed by Hl'Jl c.748 §432) 
169.411 Unlawful se,:uai pe!'!.1tration in 
the finat degree, (1) Except a.a permitted 
under ORS 163.412, aJe:rson commits the 
crime of unlawful aem penetration in. tha 
first degree if the penion penetrates the 
va~a, anus or penis of another with any 
obJect other than the penis or mouth of the 
actor and: 
(a) The victim is subjected to foroible 
compu.lsfon; 
(b) The victim ia wide:r 12 years of age; 
or 
(c) The victim ifl incapable of consent b;v 
t'eason of mental defect, mental incepaC1.-
tatioo or phyaical helpleesneee, 
(2) Unlawful sex1.u:il penetration in. ths 
:th-et de«ree is a Clas11 A felony, [:WS1 c.549 §3; 
1989 !l.36lr§6; 10011:.386 §lil] 
lfflMJ.2 Exceptions to 1,1eX1Ul.llll pene• 
tratio:n bject prolrlbltfon, 
Nothing in 408 or 163.411 prohibits 
a penetration. described in either of those 
sections when: 
(1) The penetration fo part of a medically 
recognized treatment or diagnostic proce· 
du.re; Of 
(2) The penetration is accomp}ished bf a 
p~ace officer or a Gm'Tl!:Ctions officer acting 
m official capacity, or by medical personnel 
at the t'equeat of such im officer, in o:rde:r to 
t1earch fo:r weapons, contraband or evidence 
of crime. (1981 e.lW9 §41 
168.416 Sexual abuse in the third de-
l(l'ee. (1) A person c:ommits the crime of sex.-
ual abuse in the third degree if the pt1rson 
~~ecti. another person to sexual contact; 
(a) The vfotbn does not consent to the 
aexual contact; or 
(b) The victim fs incapable of consent by 
reason of being under 18 yea.re of age, men-
tally defectivei mentally incapacitated or 
phyaically help e8S, 
(2) Sexual abuse ill the third degree ia a 
Class A misdemeanor, [19'11 c. '148 0116; 1979 c.489 
fl; 1991 o.830 fl] 
lSMllO [Repealed by 19'11 c.743 §432) 
188.421 Semal abuse fD the second 
degree. (1) A person commits the crime or 
sexual abuse in the second desree when that 
person B1lhjects another person to sexual 
1ntel'course, deviat.e sexual intercourse or, 
exce_pt as _provided in ORS 163.4121 pene-
tration of the vagina, im1J.B1 o.r penis with ~ 
object other than the penis or mouth of the 
actor and the victim , does · not consent 
thereto. 
(2) Sexual abuse in the second degree is 
o. Class C, felony. (1971 c.74:3 U,16; 1983 c.M4 §1; 1001 
e,SB6 §14; -1991 e.630 §2) 
168.42'7 SeKUBl 1ii1bueie In the tint de,, 
,tree, (1) A person commit$ the crime of l!ieX· 
ua.l abuse m the fl.rat degree when that 
person: 
(a) Subjects am,ither parson to sexual 
contact and: 
(A) The victim is leas than 14 years of 
age; or 
CB) The victim is subjected to forcible 
compuhlion by the actor; or 
. (b) Int.entlonally causes a person under 
18 yee.ra of age to touch or contact the 
mouth, anus 11r sex orgru:ull of an animal for 
the P:wJ!OSe of &rOlJl\lin.g or gratifying the 
sexual desire of a. person, 
(2) Sexual abuse in tb.e first degree is a 
Class B felony, [1001 c.880 0SJ 
Nooo1 l!i.'l.421 wllll mi!Wtl:!(l mtQ law by th@ L;,g'!11!11,-
t;!v11 Assembly but wm1 m1t 11ddod to or made a pnrl of 
ORS clrn.pter 188 or w:ij' !lllnem therein by le11111l11:tiv11 
11et!Qn. See Prefaoo to Or1111111n Ravl11ecl! St111.tuooa for fur• 
tlwr e~lauation, 
16:M.'ll r.Amended by 1967 e,359 1}$83; repillled l;y 
1911 !l.743 §4,112] 
163,485 Contributmg- to tbl!l' senutl de-
linquency of a minor. (1) A perMn 18 yeMs 
of age or older commitl':I the crime of co1:1-
tributing to the sexual delinquency of m mi-
nor if: 
(a) Being s mele, he engages in Bexual 
intercourse with a female under 18 yeara of 
age; or 
(b) Being a ftmlale, she engages in sexual 
intereouree with a male under 18 yaara of 
age; or 
(c) The person engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with BIi.Other person under 16 
years of' age o:r causea that person to engage 
m deviate sexual mta:rcoursa. 
(2) Contributing to the sexual delin-
quency of a minor ia a Ola.as A miadero.eimo:r. 
(1971 c. 743 §117) 
ltl3MO [R.ipealed by 1!171 c,743 §432] 
168.446 Sexual misconduct. Cl) A per-
son commita the crime of sexual miseonduct 
if the person enga~$ in sexual intercourse 
or deviate sexual mtercourse with an un-
mal'l'ied p81'8on wider 18 years of age. 
(2) Sexual miaconduct ii, a Class C mis-
demeanor. [1971 c.743 11181 
18MIJO (Bapuled by 1971 c. 743 §4,32} 
IIJM,ll,IJ [1971 c.74S Jll9; re)*lh!d. by 1988 <t546 §l] 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 
JUN 2 3 2015 
,sP1siSflE1'1oH 
STATE OF OREGOif 
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH 
STAT! OF ORSGO:t-i 
v. 
Ci:,;cuit. Court; Case Nbr: 02-05-3315'7 
District A~torney Nbr: 1296678 
'I'M.VIS !)A.NIEL KNOX 
Date of Proceeding: December 17, Z002 Reporter/Tape: NETWOIU< 
Defense Attorney: GEDROSE, GA~ELD JOEL 
Distric~ Attorney: MC!WTYRE 1 JAMES J 




:R.APlll Iii ~mt: 'l'Hilm DEGR.B:E 
SlllXO.lU. ABUSE il'l 'I'HE Sl!!COND l:>l'!lGUE 
Bar Nbr: 80236 
Bar Nbr: 82460 
Date of Incident 
Pafendant 1 s DOB,  Defendanc's OOL: 5570861 
D~F~NDANT WAIVED TWO-CALENDAR-DAY DELAY SEFORE SENT~~CING. 
It is adjudged that defendant has been convicted on 
Date of Conviction: 12/17/02 
Counts 3,4,5,6,7,e contained in the ctulrging instrument in this o~se are hereby 
dismissed on the motion of the Diet~ict Attorney in the interest of justice. 
Defendant was advised of. the right to appeal (ORS 137,020) . 
.. -------1 ENTERED - - - , 
I I 
I JAN 3 1 2003 1 
I J l IN REGISTER BY SB I 
-..1a11 ... 111a.._..._ ...... a1111 .... J 
J11dgroent of Conviction and Sentence Pagc.1 of? 1 C11~ 
Orlglonl:. C1mr1 Coples: D.A. ProlmUon Oefsmc Atlorney ,TaU Judge's Filt 
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~ISPOSITION 0~ COUNT l 
TT !S 0RDER1i:0 THAT THE FOLLOWING SEw.l'INC~ I$ IMrOS!01 
SGL grid coordinates are 6 and G. 
'J.'hi5 sentence ;i.$ a presWT1ptive sentence, 
PROEA'l'ION 
RECEIVED 




Defendant is placed or, probation f.or 50 MONTHS, subject to the standard 
conditions,. any special conditions indicated on the Special Probal:ionary 
Conditions attached heret:.o, and ar1y financial obligations irnpo.;,eo. in the Money 
Judgment. 
PROBATlON SUPERVISED ff{ MULTNOMAH COOW1'Y DEPT. OF' COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS. 
FIN'!!\ - di,,hmdant shl!lll pay tbe fine, if any, listed in the rnoriey judgment. 
OTHER - PURSUANT TO ORS 13 7. 540, DEFENDANT :CS SUBJECT 'TO Af..)'., THE: 
GENERAL CONO!~IONS OF PROBATION LISTED IN ORS 137.540(1) 
UNLESS SPEClFICALGY DELETED BY THE COURT. 
PER ORS 137.076, PROVIDE A BLOOD/BUCC./l.L SAMPLE AT THE 
REQUEST or THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY SH~)UFP OR STATF.: PEl?T OF 
CORRECT!ONS, AND REIMBaRSE AGENCY FOR THE COST OF OETAINIWG 
A.ND TRANSMITTING SAMPL~ IJNLESS REIMBURSEMENT IS WA!VED. 
PE;R SB 936, DEFENDANT MAY BE CONSJDEF.ED FOR TEMFORARY 
LEAVE FROM CUSTODY, REDUC'l':tON IN SENTENCE, WORK RELEASE, 
AI.,Tl1RWATIVE INCA.RCERll.'rtOl\l PROGRAM ( ,<:lF. 1l.45) , OR PROGRAM Of 
CONDITIONAL OR SUPERVISED RELEASE. 
SP~CIAL CONDI~IONS OF PROBATlON ON coum l 
IT IS ORDERED TI!ll~ THE FOLLOW!NG CONDI~LONS OF P~O~~~ION ARE IM~OSED; 
SGL 
A tenn in the county jail, not to exceed 90 DAYS where the term is to corrunence 
when the defendant:. tu~"ns self in on 12/18/02. 
CREDl'r FOR 1'l:ME SERVED. 
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM, OR VICTXM'S FAMILY. 
SEX OPJ,'ENDER REGISTRATION !?ER ORS lBl. 518 & 181, Sl.!l. 
DEFENl:>A.NT SHALL NOT POSSESS ANY P.RINTEP, PHOTOGRAPHED, OR RECORDED MATERIALS 
TH1'.'t HE MAY OSI:; FOR THE PURPOSE OF HIS DEVIANT SEXUAL l\.ROUSJiL. DEFENDANT SHALL 
NOT FREQUF,NT A.NY PLACE WHERE SUCH MATERIAL IS AVAilJl\.BL!J: 'l'O !UM FOR THE PURPOSE 
0~' DEVIANT SEXUAL AROUSAL. 
THE DEF'ENDANT IS TO r.momi.GO )\ COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION DESIGNED TO 
ADDRESS THE ISSOE OF HIS SEXUALLY-~EViANT $EHAVlOR AND PhRTICl~ATt IN A SEX 
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAM APPROVED BY T!iE l?ROBAT:i:Otil DEPARTMENT. 
Juclgmenl of Conviction and Sentence Page 2 of 7, Case 02-05·33157 
Origirnll; COW'i Cuplcs: D.A. l'rohatlon D~rcn .. qe Allorncy Jail Judge's File 
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RECl'.:IVED 
JUN 2 3 2015 
DEFEWOANT SHA.LL INVOLVE SELF IN Al,n' ME:'.t-lTAL HEALTH TREATMEN'I' RB'.J~asoo 'rtlF. 
:PROBATION OFFICER AND SHALL REMAIN IN SAID PROGRAM UNTIL SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETET.l 
0~ GIVEN FERM!SSION TO WITHDRAW. 
Tl-rn: !)J;:FENDANT SID.LL SUBMIT TO ANY PROG:R.Al)j OJ; l?H'lSIC,LOGICATJ ASSESSMENT AT THE 
DISCRETION OF THE PROBATION OFFICER, 'i'O INCLUDE THE USE OF '1'[-lE l?LE'l'HYSMOGAAPH, 
TO ASSIST IN TREATMENT, l?LN1N!NG, A.NO CASE MONITOR!NG; ANY REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO 
SUCH ASSESSMENT IS A VIOLATION OF PROBATION, 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL SUBMIT TO POLYGAAl."H TES'I'ING, AT HlS OWN EY.l,lB!IISE: ANO Wl-!ICH 
MAY BE RECOMMENDED BY THE PROBATION OFFlCER TO DETjj;RMINE H'' '('H~ il£F'E:ND/>,:N'r lS IN 
COMPLIANCE WITB THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION AND/OR FACILITATE MENTAL HEALTH 
TREATMENT, ANY REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO SUCH TESTING IS A VIOLATION Of ~~OBAt!ON, 
NO UNSlJl?ERVISED CONTACT WITH MINORS. ANY SUPERVISED CONTACT WITH MINORS MUS'l' BE 
APPROVED BY THE PROBATION O~'FlCER, 
NO LOITERING IN PLACES WHERE CHILDREN CONGREGATE. 
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PERSON, RESIDENCE, OR ANY VEHICLE WHICH HE M.~Y BE 
OPERATING, OR IN WHICH HE IS A PASSENGER, ARE SUBJECT 'I'D SEARCH AT AN'( 'l'IME ,Sy 
H!S PROBATION OFFICER, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR SEARCH WARRANT, 1'0 DETERMINE IF 
HE IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION/ ANY REFtJSAL TO St.iBHlT 
'tO SUCH TESTING IS A VIOLATION OF PROBATION. 
PURSOA.NT TO OREGON EVIDENCE CODE RULE #504, THAT THE DEFENDANT WAIVES ALL 
CLIENT/PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGES. 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL BEAR ANY F'INA.NCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AS DIRECTED BY HIS 
PROBATION OFFICE;R, l"OR ~)' COUNSEl,:r:NG, '!'HERAPY, 'I'REATMl!N''l', Al'1P Wi:DlCM COSTS 
INCURRED BY THE VICTIM AS A RESUL'l' OF THIS OFFENSE. 
Judgment or Conviction and Sentence Page 3 of 7, Case 02-05-33157 
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r 
DIS906ITION 0~ C:Omn' l 
IT ~s ORDmRED TKII.T ~HE FOLLOW~~G SZlfl'l!INCE IS lllJPOBED: 
SGL grid coordinates ~re 7 and G. 
This sentence is a presumptive sentence. 
·RECEIVED 
JUN 2 3 2015 
ISP/BCI/SOF1 
SGL 
Defendant is placed on probation for 60 Momes, subject to the standard 
conditions, an~ spacial condit~ons indicaced on the Special P~opationary 
Conditions attached hereto, and any financial obligations imposed in the Money 
Judgment:.. 
PROBATION SUP~RVISSO DY MULTNO~H COUNTY DEPT. OF COMMUNITY coaRECTIONS. 
nmi ~ defenclant. shall pay the fine, if any, listed in the 1noney judgment. 
O~HER - PURSUANT TO o~s 137.540, DEFENDANT IS SU~JECT TO ALL THI 
GENERAL CONDI'I'IONS OF PROBA'l'lON LISTED IN ORS 137. 540 ( 1) 
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DELETED BY THE COURT. 
PER oas 1)7.076, PROV!PE A SLOOO/BUCCAL SAMPLE AT THE 
REQUEST OF THE MULTNOMAH COUNT¥ SHERIFF OR STATE DEPT OF 
CORRECTIONS, ruID RE!Ml:SURSE AGENCY FOR THE COST OF OBTAINING 
AND TAANSMITTING SAMPLi UNLESS REIMaURSEMENT IS WAIWO, 
PER SB 936; DEFENDANT MAY BE CONSioaRED FOR TEMPOP..ARY 
LEAVE FROM CUSTODY, fl.EDUCTION IN SENTENCE, WORK RELEASE, 
ALTEiillATIVE INCA~CERATION PROGRAM (SB 1145), 0~ PROORAM OF 
CONDITION.!U, O~ SUPERVISED RELEASE. 
SPECIAL CONDJ;'rlORS OF PaOBATrON ON CO'tffl'l' 2 
IT ~a ORDERED THAT ~a FOLLOWING COiiD~~IOHS OF PROBAT~ON AU XMfOSED; 
SGL 
A terrn in the coun~y jail, not to exceed 90 DAYS, concurrent with jail sentenca 
in count 1, whar~ t.he term is to eornrnence when the defendant turns self in on 
12/18/02. 
CRED+T FOR TIME SERVED. 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION •ro RUN CONCURRENT WITH THOSE IMPOSED IN COUNT l. 
NO CON~ACT WITH VICTIM, OR VICTIM'S F,F>..MILY. 
six OF~iND~R REGXSTRAf!ON PeR ORS 181.518 & 181.519. 
Jmlgment ot'Conviction and Sentence Pa.gc 4 of 7, Case 02-0S-33157 
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RECEIVl::D 
JUN 2 3 2015 
DEFENDANT sHAL:i., NO'l' ~ossEss ANY PRINTED, PHOTOGRAPHED. OR REco~'1Ui:\~a6.ltOOiLs 
THAT H~ MA.Y USE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HIS DEVIANT SEXUAL A~OUSAL. DEFENDANT SHALL 
N'O'l' FREQ!JE:m' All1Y PLACE WHERE SUCH MA.TERIAL IS AVAILA8LS TO HIM FOFI. THE PURPOSE 
OF l:IEV'll\NT SEXUAL AROUSAL. 
THE DEFENDANT rs TO UNDERGO A COMPLETE PSYCHO~OGlCAL EVALOAfION P?SIGNED TO 
ADDRESS TH& lSSUE OF HIS SEXUAL:t..Y DEVIANT BEHAVIOR ANO PARTICIPAT~ :nr A SEX 
OFFENil2R TREATMENT PROGRAMAPPROVED BY THE PROaATlON D~P~RTMZNT, 
DEFENDANT SHALL INVOLVE SELF IN ANY MENTAL J,!.EALTH TREATMENT RECOMMEN!>l::D BY THE 
~ROBATION OFFICER 1>.N'.D SHALL REMAIN IN SA!D ~ROGRAM UNTIL SUCCESSFULLY COMP~E~ED 
OR GIVEN PERMISSION 'l"O WITHDRAW. 
THE DEFENDANT SHALJ'., SUBMIT TO ANY PROGfUU,I OF PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AT THE 
DISCRETION OF THE ~~oaATION OFFICER, TO INCLUDE THE USE OF THE PLETHYSMOGAA~H. 
TO ASSIST IN' TREATMENT, PLANNING, ANO CASE MONITORING; ANY R1::Ft7SAL TO SUBMIT TO 
SUCH ASSESSMENT IS A VIOLATION OF PROBATION. 
THI!: DEFENDANT SHALJ, SUBMIT TO POLYGRAPH TE;STING, AT HIS OWN EXPENSE AND WHICH 
MAY BE RtCOMME»DED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER TO DETERMIW! IF tHE P2FENDANT IS IN 
COMP~l~CE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION ANO/OR FACILI~ATB MENTAL HEALTH 
TREATMENT, ANY REFUSAl, 'rO SOSMIT TO SUCH TESTING IS A VIOLATION OF PROBATION. 
NO l1NSUPERVISgD CONTACT WITH MINORS, Am SUPERVISED CONTACT WrT~ ~!NORS MUST BE 
APPROVED BY THE PROBATION OFFIC~R. 
NO LOITERING IN PU\.C~S WHERE CHILDREN CONGR6G~TE. 
TiiAT TH.E DEFENDANT'S l'EP..SOt-1 1 l'lES!DENCE, OR ANY VEHICLE WHICH HE MAY BE 
OPERATING, OR IN WHICH HE IS A PASSENGER, ARlt SUBJECT TO SEARCH AT Am TlME BY 
HIS PROBATION OFFlCER, WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR SEARCH WARRANT, TO DETER~IWE IF 
HE IS :IN COMPt.:n~NCE WITH THE CONDITIOl-JS OF HIS PROBATION; MY REr"USI\L TO SUBMIT 
TO SUCH TESTING IS A VIOLATION OF PRO'!!.ATION, 
PURSUANT TO OREGON ll:VIbENC! COO£ RULE t504, THAT T~E DEFENDANT WAIVES ALL 
CLIE:NT/PSYCHOTH~AA?.IST PRIVILEGES, 
THE DEFF..NOJ\.m SSA:u~ B~hR AN'l FINANCIAL RESPONS!SILITY, AS DIRECTED BY HIS 
PROBATION OFFICER, FOR ANY COUNSELING, THtAAPY, TREATMENT, AND MEOICAL COSTS 
INCURRED BY THE VICTIM AS A RESULT OP THIS OFFENSE. 
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence Page S of 7 j Case 0Z-05-33157 
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0udgrnent c~editor, STATE OF OREGON 
Obliga. Uon: 
* (1) Penalty Assessmsnt {CIC) 
(2) Restitution (REST) 
(3) lndigent Defense Recovery (IDRC) 
(4) Fine (FINE) 
" (5) BPS1 {BPAS) 
• (6) DUll Conviction (DMVC) 
• ( 7) DMV R~cords {MVRA) 
• (8) Jail Asee~~rnent (CJAS) 
·• ( 9) Other; 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FUND ASSES5MI:!:!'-l~' 
'l'OTAL MONEY JUDGMEl'l'!' 
R~CElVED 
2 3 20!5 
lSf:>/BCI/SOH 
Judgment Debtor: DEf'ENJ)l"-N''.l' 
SGL 











'Onles,s, a wai11sr i~ i.mlii;:ate,d, those fess 1i1nd aase,s.sroen~$ warked are ,o bo !mposed administn,ctvely 
if the runount is l"t~ bllll1k, 1!.nel W.i.ll )le a conditie>n o( prob1it>Otl 1 and will not be sub:\1,1~1;. to 
judgment dock"'t:l.ng. 
'ttrorn OF l'.lAYMENT: Tlrn amount of the mon"y judgmraent is: 
to b~ paid in installrr10nts of $35 .00 per mor1th 1 beginnirig an 06/15/03 i'.mrJ due 
each month i:.herec1tter on that date! 1mtil satisfied; 
Date Signed: 
Juilg-ment of Conviction and Sentence 
Signature (Appli@Q to all counts) 
JULIE E. FRANTZ 
Typed oi Printed Name of Judge 
Page 6 of7, Case 0Z-05·33157 
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JUN 2 a 201s sGL 
ISP/BCI/SOH 
J"udgment Credi tor: S'fATE OF OREGON ,Judgment babtor, DEFBNPANT 
Obligation· Total Imposed Waived 
·• (1) Penalty- Ass..-ssrnent (CIC)-SUS!?ENDED $ 105.00 
(2) Restitution (REST) $ 
( 3) Xndigent Defense Recovery (IDRC) $ 
(4) Fine (FINE} $ .. ( 5) /31?.S'I' (BPAS) $ 
" (6) DUII Convict.ion (Dl"l'JC) $ 
k (7) DMV Records (MVR/\) $ 
* ( 8) Jail Asses!lroEHit (CJA5) $ 
• (9) Other: 
DOMESTlC VIOLENCE FOND ASSESSMEN'I'-SUSJ?ENDED 500,00 
TOTAL MONEY JUDGMEN'J' $ 
•ur,le~~ a 1'Jaivsr :t,, indicated, tho~e fsaG NJO as5;,i:;e;roe111;.5 markGd <1re to be impo~eo adrninistr.i.ttvely 
H ~hfl' s'lmount is lot~ blank, a.nd will be " ooml:i.tion ot prob11tion, ~nd will MC be ~ubject c0 
judgment dcicksting. 
TERMS OF PA~YIE~}te a 0)1.J.nt 
Date Signi;;.d: • ~ 
' ..,,,. 
.lodgment of Conviction tuid Sentence 
Typed or. Printed Name of Judge 
Pag(! 7 of7, CaGe 02-05-33157 
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Clerk of the Court 
Second Judicial District 
County of Nez Perce 
PO Box 896 
Lewiston ID 83501 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE 01' THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
!..AWRENCE G. WASDEN 
RE; Case No. CV-2016-1673 
Travis David Knox vs State of 
HPC AUDITDF'.'::1 IJFFICE 
liZ]OOl/042 
Brief with Table of Contents, Table of Authorities and Appendices 
Total of 42 pages including this cover letter 
Dear Clerk: 
Pursuant to yotir conversation with Cheryl Rambo, please find the attached the 
Respondent's Brief. Could you please file the Brief and return the conformed 
first page the brief for my files. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call at 208-884-7050. Thank you for 
your assistance. 
Sincerely, 0 
3t¼~ +\-. ,oe .... 
Susan A Poe 
Senior Paralegal 
Idaho State Police 
Legal Division 
cc: Kate A Hawkins 
Attorney at Law 
¢rlrril111:11 L!lW 0111la1on, Idaho State Polloo 
700 S. Stratford Drive, Meridian, Idaho 83642 






























Y A/"7 11 01 
crcrr· :.· f( (~rry;~n. :.. ~Wt·~· .fl '•., I . ~ 
iJ '-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, ) Case No. CV-2015-0001673 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding ) 
Sex Offender Registration 




) ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE TO 
) FILE REPLY BRIEF AND HEARING ON 
) ORAL ARGUMENT 
) 
) 
BASED UPON the Stipulation to Extend Deadlines to File Reply Brief and Continuance of 
Oral Argument concurrently herewith, and good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the deadline for filing Petitioner's 
Reply Brief shall be November 28, 2016 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Telephonic Oral Argument shall take place before the 
above-entitled Court on December 13, 2016, at 11:00 a.m Pacific Time. The Court will initiate 
the call. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofNovember, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
KATE A. HAWKINS D U.S. Mail 
CLARK AND FEENEY j('J" Hand Delivered 
P O DRAWER 285 D Overnight Mail 
LEWISTON ID 83501 D Telecopy (FAX) 
CHERYL RAMBO ~ U.S. Mail 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL D 
IDAHO STATE POLICE D 
700 S. STRATFORD DRIVE D 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
C 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 




























PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
Kate A. Hawkins 
Idaho State Bar no. 9097 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 20(~~001673 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
* * * * * * * * * * 
COMES NOW, TRAVIS DAVID KNOX, the petitioner in the above-entitled matter, by 
and through his undersigned attorneys of record, hereby respectfully submits the following 
Memornndmn in rr:'.sponse to Respondent's Brief. 
1. IN RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, THE FACTORS USED TO 
DETERMINE EQUIVALENCY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS. 
Petitioner vehemently disagrees with the Respondents application of Idaho case law to the 
case at bar. Respondent states that the Agency, in making its equivalency determination, bases 
its decision on previous convictions and not current dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism. 
Respondent's Brief p.12 11. 3-4 (citing ID APA Rule 11.10.03.12). Respondent points to this strict 
Petitioner's Reply Brief -1-
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conviction-conviction determination in its statement that additional due process is not required in 
the current case. In support of this conclusion, Respondent points to ID AP A Rule 11.10. 03 .12 
which specifically allows the Agency to review information irrelevant to the criminal charges 
brought in a different jurisdiction in rendering its final order. Id. 
IDAPA Rule 11.10.03.12 (8)(c) delineates the materials which may be used for equivalency 
determinations, specifically, the regulations allow for the use of an individuals' psychosexual 
evaluation report in making its determination. The equivalency board's use of an individual's 
psychosexual report completely contradicts the notion that these determinations are made arising 
from a mere sex offense conviction, as the information in a psychosexual evaluation provides 
nothing in regards to the interpretation of a statute, and provides information entirely on the 
future recidivism of the individual. 
Due to the Respondent's contention that IDAPA Rules 11.10.03.12 "spell out how the SOR 
makes its determinations in cases such as Mr. Knox's", Mr. Knox should be afforded due 
process as to the determinations made as the equivalency board's determinations were not 
merely a comparison of statutes between Oregon and Idaho. If the Equivalency Board did not 
use these_methods as stated in Respondent's Brief, it is pertinent to know what information was 
reviewed in rendering this final order other than "other documents" relating to the underlying 
criminal case. 
2. THE FINAL ORDER RESULTING FROM THE AGENCY ACTION REQUIRES 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO THE ADVERSE PARTY, WHICH THE 
AGENCY FAILED UPHOLD 
The Idaho Supreme Court has already stated that due process concerns require an 
administrative tribunal to first serve an affected party with fair notice and an opportunity to meet 
an issue before raising an issue. Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779,781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 
Petitioner's Reply Brief -2-
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(2005); White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887,889 (1977). As 
previously stated in Petitioner's Brief in support of petition for Judicial Review, the fact that the 
agency action resulted in a final order makes this a "contested case" requiring duties to be 
undertaken by Mr. Knox for the rest of his life. These duties that Mr. Knox will be required to 
abide by, come with significant repercussions for any faults due to the dubious Order rendered 
by the Agency. Due to the issuance of a final order pertaining to Mr. Knox's future duties, this 
"contested case" requires that the parties receive notice of time, place, and nature of the hearing 
as well as notice as to the issues to be considered. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 98 Idaho 860,865,574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). 
In the case at bar the Agency failed to provide Mr. Knox with any information, whatsoever, 
prior to the issuance of a final order. Mr. Knox was not notified as to the time, place, and nature 
of the hearing, or even a statement of the legal authority or.the matters and issues involved. 
These Idaho procedures delegated to Agencies holding hearings in contested cases, were 
egregiously violated as to every requirement during the Agency's quasi-judicial function in 
issuing its final order to Mr. Knox. Despite this quasi-judicial action taken by the Agency, the 
'rudiments of fair play' were certainly not adhered to in refusing to notify the adverse party of 
such action, as required by Idaho Code, so as to permit the opportunity to be heard and allow for 
constitutional requirements to be adhered to. As such the process prescribed to the agency by the 
legislature was not upheld and the agency order should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Travis David Knox, respectfully requests this court reverse the 
findings of the Agency and remand the matter back with instructions to vacate the Final Order 
Purporting to establish a new equivalency determination of Mr. Knox's Oregon offenses. 
P~titioner's Reply Brief -3-
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DATED This day of November, 2016. 
FEENEY, LLP 
\._ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day November, 201 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
CHER YI, RAMBO 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO POLICE 
700 S. STRATFORD DRIVE 
MERIDIAN ID 83642 
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In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, ) 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding ) 
Sex Off ender Registration ) 
) 





Case No. CV-2015-0001673 
ORDER TO VACATE ORAL 
ARGUMENT AND SUBMIT CASE TO 
COURT BASED ON BRIEFING 
BASED UPON the Stipulation to Vacate Oral Argument and Submit Case to the Court Based 
on Briefing, concurrently herewith, and good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the oral argument is vacated and the 
Court shall render a decision based on the record and briefings filed with the Court. 
,qf' 
DATED THIS _1 _ day of December, 2016. 
/,,--, 
---~--z-~ - ~ ······ J~"'",;_,._----





















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
P O DRAWER 285 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
CHERYL RAMBO 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
In the Matter of the Agency's Finding of ) 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order ) 
Regarding Sex Offender Registration ) 
) 
) 




CASE NO. CV 2015-001673 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
This matter came before the Court on Petition for Judicial Review from the 
Agency's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender 
Registration, dated August 5, 2015. On December 14, 2016, this Court entered an Order 
to Vacate Oral Argument and Submit Case to Court Based on Briefing. The Petitioner is 
represented by Kate Hawkins, of the firm Clark and Feeney. The Agency is represented 
by Cheryl Rambo, Deputy Attorney General. The Court, :finding the matter fully 
submitted and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2002, the Petitioner was charged and convicted in the State of Oregon of Rape 
in the Third Degree, O.R.S. § 163.3551 and Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, O.R.S. § 
1 Rape in the third degree is defined by Oregon statute as: 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
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163.425.2 R. at section 3. The Petitioner moved to Lewiston, Idaho in 2003, at which 
time he registered in Idaho as a sex offender. R. at section 1. 
On June 2, 2015, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Release from Registration 
Requirements and Expungement of Record. While the record is not clear whether this 
Petition triggered the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry (hereinafter "SOR") to initiate 
an equivalency determination, on August 5,201 a separate action, the SOR issued an 
agency final order. The June 2, 2015 petition has been stayed pending the outcome in 
this matter. 
The August 5, 2015, final order was issued pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8304(l)(b), 18-
8304(4) and IDAPA 11.10.03.12 et seq. The order determined that the Petitioner's 2002 
foreign sex offense convictions from State of Oregon were substantially equivalent to 
LC.§ 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen. The final order determined 
the offenses to be "aggravated offenses" pursuant to § 18-8303(1). As a result, the 
Petitioner is required to continue registration for life with the SOR, as long as he resides 
in the State of Idaho. The Petitioner has appealed the final order to this Court for review. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the substantial rights of Mr. Knox were prejudiced when the 
agency failed to provide him due process prior to its issuance of a final 
order that has the foll force and effect of law. 
(1) A person commits the crime ofrape in the third degree if the person has sexual 
intercourse with another person under 16 years of age. (2) Rape in the third degree is a 
Class C felony. 
ORS§ 163.355 (1992-present). 
2 Sexual abuse in the second degree is defined by Oregon statute as: 
(1) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the SECOND degree when that person 
subjects another person to sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or, except as 
provided in ORS 163.142, penetration of the vagina, anus or penis with any object other 
than the penis or mouth of the actor and the victim does not consent thereto. (2) Sexual 
abuse in the SECOND degree is a Class C felony. 
ORS§ 163.425 (1992-2009). 
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2. Whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion when the redetermination of equivalency was made. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of an agency action is governed by the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act. See LC. § 67-5270. In reviewing an order issued by an agency, the court 
shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e)arbitrary, capricious,. or an abuse of discretion. 
LC. § 67-5279(3). Further, the agency action shall be affirmed "unless substantial rights 
of the appellant have been prejudiced." LC. § 67-5279(4). The court shall not substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
LC. § 67-5279(1). If the action of the agency is not affirmed, it must be set aside in 
whole or in part and remanded to the agency for further proceedings as necessary. LC.§ 
67-5279(3). 
DISCUSSION 
1. Whether the substantial rights of Mr. Knox were prejudiced when the 
agency failed to provide him due process prior to its issuance of a fmal 
order that has the full force and effect of law. 
The Petitioner first became aware that SOR had taken an agency action to 
determine whether the Oregon offenses were equivalent to an offense in Idaho that 
would require life long registration when he received a copy of the August 5, 2015 Final 
Order. He asserts that SOR's failure to notify him or his attorney ofrecord prior to the 
equivalency determination, so that he could have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
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resulted in SOR failing to provide due process. He also asserts that he has no 
knowledge of the procedures the agency follows in making an equ.ivalency 
determination, which is also a violation of due process. 
A similar issue of due process was recently addressed by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Groves v. State, 156 Idaho 552,328 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2014). In this case, 
Groves asserted he was denied due process because he was not given a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before SOR made an equ.ivalency determination that his offenses 
were "aggravated offenses" which required life time registration. The Groves Court 
distinguished the finding that someone is a "violent sexual predator" from the 
3 The Groves Court discussed a 2009 case, Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 203 P .3d 1221 
(2009), and explained the difference between a finding of "violent sexual predator" and 
the classification of an "aggravated offense." 
In support of his contention that he was denied due process of law, Groves 
cites an Idaho Supreme Court decision that held that Idaho's system for 
designating a person a "violent sexual predator" failed to comport with the 
constitutional requirement of procedural due process. Smith v. State, 146 
Idaho 822,827,203 P.3d 1221, 1226 (2009). It held that "where a person's 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential." Id (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437, 91 
S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515, 519-20 (1971)). In that case, the Court 
reasoned that the "violent sexual predator" designation functions as a 
"badge of infamy" because it affmnatively labels an offender. Smith, 146 
Idaho at 827,203 P.3d at 1226. Furthermore, the designation "is based 
upon a factual determination of probable future conduct; i.e., that the 
offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in 
predatory sexual conduct." Id at 828,203 P.3d at 1227. 
We conclude that the holding in Smith regarding "violent sexual 
predators" is inapposite and further conclude that the reasoning in Smith 
shows that Groves's due process claim is meritless. In that case, the Court 
distinguished "the duty to register as a sex offender" from being 
designated a "violent sexual predator" because the former "is triggered 
simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime." Id It reasoned that 
because the duty to register is triggered "solely on the fact of conviction of 
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The Groves Court explained that with respect to the determination that a sex 
offense is an "aggravated offense," procedural due process is afforded to an offender 
during the criminal process. Therefore, an offender is not entitled to additional due 
process at the time the SOR makes an equivalency determination. 
The determination that an offense is an "aggravated offense" is analogous 
to the determination of which offenders must register and is not analogous 
to designating a person a "violent sexual predator." As is relevant here, 
LC. § 18-8303 defines an "aggravated offense" and does so by reference 
to the crime charged. This is analogous to the provision in LC.§ 18-8304 
that sets forth the crimes that trigger a duty to register. Both the duty to 
register and eligibility to seek an exemption from the duty to register are 
triggered "simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime." 
Moreover, designating an offense an "aggravated offense" does not affix 
any "badge of infamy" because it is a classification of the offense, not the 
r:-...-::-~- --- ... -- -. __ ,,,. _____________ -
i\i? 
offender. Moreover, unlike the "violent sexual predator" label, the 1~., 
determination that an offense is aggravated does label a person as having lri-
---been-Speci-ficall-y-~found~to-be1ikel-¥---to-engage_in_aeyspecif_ic___conduct--iJ· ,_.__ _______ -----!~ 
the future. Finally, Groves was afforded procedural due process prior to l
1
·._l_:_-~-~-
his conviction. For these reasons, Groves was not entitled to additional -. 
procedural due process. 1}~ 
Groves, at 558, 328 P.3d at 538. See also State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 46, 266 P.3d 
1146, 1151 (2011). The Johnson Court held the 2009 amendments do not attach 
additional notoriety to an offender's registration status, but, rather, just affect his ability 
to petition for exemption. Thus, the offender has not been deprived of due process when 
the offense committed is classified as an "aggravated offense." Id. 
In the case before this Court, the Petitioner fails to establish that his right to due 
process was violated. His circumstances are similar to those in Johnson and Groves, 
where the Petitioner was afforded procedural due process prior to his conviction. Similar 
a predicate offense" and because an offender was provided due process to 
dispute that charge prior to his conviction, he is not entitled to additional 
due process. Id. 
Id. at 558, 328 P.3d at 538. 
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to the case at hand, Groves was heard in 2014, after the changes to the Sexual Offender 
Registration Notification and Community Right to Know Act (hereinafter "SORA") was 
amended in 2012. Thus, this Court finds the holding in Groves binding on this matter. 
The Petitioner was afforded due process at the time the criminal matter was addressed. 
Thus, he was not entitled to a separate and distinct hearing prior to the time the SOR 
made the equivalency determination in this case. 
2. Whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion when the redetermination of equivalency was made. 
Next, the Petitioner contends the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an 





witho.uLauthori:cy_i<LillL£o.~~P~titioner_contends that an equivalencydecision was i .. ~-------~i:t?: 
made in 2003 when the Petitioner moved to Idaho, and thus, a redetermination of 
equivalency in 2015-based upon current law-was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Idaho appellate courts have held that the SORA applies retroactively to 
persons who have been convicted of specific crimes before the statute was enacted. See 
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,982 P.2d 931 (1999); State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 137 P.3d 
461 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41,266 P.3d 1146 (2011). The United 
States Supreme Court discussed the Ex Post Facto Clause with respect to sex offender 
registration in Smith v. Doe, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 538 U.S. 84, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2002). 
Based upon these cases, the Court finds that the SOR's final order in this case was 
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Final Order is 
affirmed. 
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' ~ I 
ORDER 
The SO R's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex 
Offender Registration, dated August 5, 2015 is HEREBY AFFIRMED. IT IS SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED this l0t"-day of January 2017. 
istrict Judge 
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Kate Hawkins 
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whether the Court exceeded the statutory of the agency; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
In the Matter of the Agency's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding 
Sex Offender Registration 
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JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
In accordance with the Court's Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review dated 
January 10, 2017, the SOR's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex 
Offender Registration, dated August 5, 2015, is HEREBY AFFIRMED. 
Rule 54(b) Certificate 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment it is hereby certified, in 
accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason for 
delay of entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby direct that the above 
judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken a 
provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeal able orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 ( f) 
I.A.R. 
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whether the Court considered the evidence taken under advisement; 
whether the Cout1 exceeded the statutory authority of the agency; and 
whether the Cami's decision was made upon unlawful procedure. 
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